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This thesis consists of three chapters covering the role of firms in macroeconomics.
The first chapter focuses on the labour share of income. Theoretical and practi-
cal issues surrounding measurement are discussed and novel empirical applications
are explored. Utilising household survey data, new time series are constructed for
full-time equivalent employees and counter-factual proprietor labour income. These
series used to generate estimates of the labour share which constitute a conceptual
improvement over the existing official UK methodology. Additionally, the classifi-
cation of firm intellectual property investment and its implications for the measure-
ment of the labour share are examined. The results shown that the careful treatment
of proprietor income and intellectual property products suggests there has been little
to no decline in the UK labour share.
The second chapter explores the role of rising markups on optimal capital taxation.
The Chamley-Judd result states that the taxation of capital income should converge
to zero in the long run. However, recent empirical studies suggest that average
firm-level markups have increased substantially over the past two decades; a direct
implication is a rise in the share of aggregate profits. The zero long run optimal
capital tax result is revisited in this context. A structural model of firm entry with
monopolistic competition is developed where the fiscal authority cannot differentiate
between aggregate profits and productive capital income. It is shown that when
markups are sufficiently high, aggregate profits in equilibrium become large enough
such that it is optimal to positively tax capital income in the long run - beyond
a certain threshold the efficiency gains from taxing lump-sum profits outweigh the
distortion caused by inadvertently taxing future investments in physical capital.
The third chapter examines the comovement problem in the context of firm dy-
namics. Empirical observations show that consumption and investment are both
pro-cyclical over the business cycle. However, investment shocks in structural mod-
els typically generate opposing responses for consumption and investment. This
paper develops a model of firm entry with business churn and endogenous overhead
costs which produces the appropriate unconditional comovement between consump-
tion, investment, hours and output. Moreover, this paper demonstrates that CES
production technology with an elasticity of substitution well below unity, in line with
empirical estimates, generates the observed comovements between macroeconomic
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The study of the role of firms in economics has its origins in a seminal paper by
Coase (1937). In this paper, Coase explores why firms exist and why production
is not simply organised by individuals. The conclusion drawn is that firms exist to
minimise the transaction costs associated with coordinating economic activity and
that activity within firms can be characterised by an absence of a price mechanism
- “islands of conscious power in [an] ocean of unconscious cooperation”
While there has long existed empirical studies on the role of firms, it was not until
more recently that the explicit modelling of dynamic firms gained traction in macroe-
conomics. This strand of literature grew substantially in the decade following the
Great Recession as mainstream macroeconomics reassessed itself and broadened its
scope.
This has subsequently motivated a range of papers which aim to model firm be-
haviour at the macroeconomic level as a means of understanding economic phenom-
ena. This thesis broadly fits into that component of the literature, in particular
in the second and third chapters which build on the seminal paper of Bilbiie, et al
(2012).
The first chapter of this thesis is empirical. It examines measurement issues re-
lated to the labour share of income. Particularly the role of unincorporated firm
income and the classification of intellectual property products. It is argued that
only through the careful treatment of qualitative assumptions can the labour share,
and by extension capital and profit share, provide valuable economic insights on the
macroeconomy.
The second chapter studies the impact of firms on optimal taxation. When fiscal
authorities cannot differentiate between two sources of capital income, two opposing
objectives must be reconciled with a single flat-rate tax on capital. From an efficiency
perspective, the government wishes to tax profits, but not interest derived from
productive physical capital. Modelling firms explicitly in a structural framework
allows for quantification of the direct effect of the average markups on the optimal
rates of taxation.
The third chapter explores the impact of investment shocks on business cycle fluctu-
ations through the framework of dynamic firm entry and the inclusion of adjustment
costs and overhead costs. Firms exhibiting CES production technology with an elas-
ticity of substitution significantly below unity generate the observed comovements
between macroeconomic aggregates in response to investment shocks and improves
model fit in terms of second moments.
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1 The Labour Share: Proprietor
Income and Intellectual Property
Abstract
The labour share plays a fundamental role as a parameter in macroeconomic models
and motivates a growing body of literature with regards to its apparent decline. De-
spite its crucial importance, there exists no robust consensus on how to measure the
labour share in practice. This paper explores some of the conceptual and practical
issues surrounding estimation and provides a novel empirical application. Utilising
household survey data, more conceptually accurate estimates of proprietor labour
income are constructed for the UK; additionally, the approach of Koh, et al (2018)
is considered and extended to the UK economy. This paper demonstrates that the
careful treatment of proprietor income and intellectual property products suggests
there has been little to no decline in the UK labour share.
7
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1.1 Introduction
The concept of the labour dates back to classical economics. However, there exists
no exact consensus on how to quantify the portion of national income which accrues
to labour; primarily because it is not possible to directly observe all labour income.
For example, unincorporated enterprises do not exist as separate legal entities from
their owners; as such, they can freely move assets between business and personal
accounts. For this reason, it is not possible to distinguish between earnings from
work and the entrepreneurial profit in an unincorporated enterprise. The mixed
nature of proprietor income, which contains both capital and labour remunerations,
necessitates that any estimate of self-employed labour income must be imputed. As
a consequence, all measures the labour share are subject to unavoidable qualitative
assumptions regarding the apportioning of ambiguous income. It is these conceptual
assumptions, along with novel empirical applications for the UK economy, which are
further explored in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 consists of a literature
review. Section 3 reviews several different approaches to measuring the labour share.
Section 4 provides an empirical application and utilises household survey data to
construct novel estimates of the labour share in the UK. Section 5 considers the
role intellectual property products (IPP), as emphasised by Koh, et al (2018), and
applies this approach to UK data. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Classical economists wrote at length about the distribution of factor income. In fact,
Ricardo (1817) claimed that ‘to determine the laws which regulate this distribution,
is the principal problem in political economy’. However, despite its long conceptual
history, attempts to formally quantify the labour share only began in the 20th
century - the first task to be undertaken by the NBER, upon its foundation in 1920,
was the estimation of the ‘approximate size and [functional] distribution of national
income’.1 Although early measurement efforts were often hampered by theoretical
1See the opening paragraph of the first chapter of King (1930).
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concerns and a lack of comprehensive data, an emerging consensus grew over the
decades regarding the perceived stability of the labour share. With this in mind,
Kaldor (1957) fashioned several ‘stylised’ facts - the first of which emphasised the
constancy of the share of national income received by labour (and capital).
However, in recent years, economists have challenged this notion and turned their
attention towards the apparent protracted decline of the labour share across indus-
trialised economies. This trend has motivated a growing body of literature devoted
to accounting for the alleged decline - both from an empirical and theoretical per-
spective.
A seminal paper by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) argues that the fall in the
relative price of investment goods has been a key driver of the decline in the labour
share globally. They suggest that this trend has contributed to approximately 50%
of the observed fall in the labour share. The intuition is that investment-specific
technological change reduces the cost of capital goods relative to labour, therefore,
firms substitute labour for capital and this pushes down the labour share as pro-
duction becomes more capital intensive. However, this reasoning is contingent on
an elasticity of factor substitution σ = 1.25; far greater than the vast majority of
empirical estimates (Chirkino, 2008, Leon-Ledesma 2011). The consensus in the
literature is overwhelmingly in favour of σ < 1. This suggests that there is lower
substitutability between factors than is assumed by Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014), and that, contrary to their argument, capital-deepening would theoretically
result in a rising labour share.
On the other hand, Elsby, et al (2013) argue that investment-specific technological
change has only contributed weakly to a decline in the labour share; payroll shares
observed across US industries exhibits no strong correlation with changes in their
respective investment good prices. Instead, Elbsy, et al (2013) claim that the decline
in the US labour share (driven by a fall in the payroll share) has its origins in glob-
alisation and the off-shoring of labour intensive production to developing economies
with lower labour costs.
Piketty (2014) advances a slightly different but more simplistic narrative. Capital-
deepening rises when the rate of growth g falls; however, the average return to
9
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capital r tends to remain stable over time. The relative decline in output growth
over the past few decades implies the inequality r > g. This causes the capital share
to rise as total output grows more slowly than capital income; by construction the
labour share falls. Similarly, Piketty and Zucman (2014) observe declining labour
shares across industrialised economies and argue that the average return to capital
has experienced a proportionally smaller fall relative to the increase capital stock.
They suggest that this is due to an increase in the bargaining power of capital as a
result of globalisation and the increased mobility of capital; a rise in the bargaining
power of capital subsequently depresses the labour share.
However, contrary to this, Lawrence (2015) proposes a neoclassical account for the
decline in the labour share, consistent with the empirical evidence of σ < 1. The
claim is that the effective capital-labour ratio has fallen in most industries in the
US because the increase in the physical capital-labour ratio has been offset by rapid
labuor-augmenting technological change. This has increased the supply of labour
available and has therefore actually decreased the effective capital-labour ratio. Util-
ising a standard CES production function, with gross complementary σ < 1, it fol-
lows that a decline in the effective capital-labour ratio produces a decline in the
labour share of income. Lawrence (2015) suggests that this can account for most of
the observed decline in the labour share in the US.
While there are other channels which may contribute to the decline in the labour
shares such as, increasing mark ups, changes in the skill composition of workers,
weaker bargaining power of labour and political capture, some argue that there
has actually been no decline in the labour share and that measurement issues or
accounting practices have been the source of the apparent decline.
For example, Bridgeman (2014) argues that the standard procedure for calculating
factor shares can be problematic as it does not capture changes in the share of
depreciation in output. The intuition is that there exists a portion of output which is
used up in the production process and which cannot be used for current consumption
or future investment; consumption of fixed capital. A rising share of depreciation in
output, brought about by the increasing prevalence of IT goods (which on average
depreciation more quickly than other investment goods) can create the appearance
10
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of a declining labour share. The implication is that an increasing portion of output
is implicitly and erroneously being attributed to capital income - when, in fact, it is
used up in production and should not be attributed to capital or labour. Applying
this accounting procedure to the US economy, Bridgeman (2014) shows that the
labour share exhibits no decline and is within its historical range.
Additionally, Armenter (2015) claims that changes in the classification of proprietor
income and increases in the number of self-employed people have resulted in an un-
derestimation of the labour share in the US. Until 2001 the methodology used by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) entailed that about 80% of proprietor income was
attributed to labour. However, after 2001, the new methodology entailed that less
than 50% of proprietor income should be classified as labour income. Retroactively
applying the pre-2001 BLS methodology Armenter (2015) finds that approximately
one-third of the drop in the BLS measure of the labour share since 2001 can be
attributed changes in the classification of proprietor income. This point is further
supported by examining the payroll share, which naturally excludes proprietor in-
come, and shows a much smaller decline than the BLS headline measure.
Beyond the issue of proprietor income, there also exists the problem of how to classify
different types of expenditure in the economy. Koh, et al (2018) note that intellec-
tual property products have previously been considered as intermediate inputs by
the BEA, but recently have been reclassified as investments. This reclassification is
important from an accounting perspective as the decision to include IPP as invest-
ment revises up the value of Gross Value Added (GVA) and revises down the value
of intermediate inputs.
Essentially, a portion of intermediate inputs has been reallocated to GVA. This
unambiguously increases GVA and therefore increases the value of the denominator
when constructing the labour share. From a purely logical basis, this results in a
lower value of the labour share. To ensure that the national accounting identity
holds, any income derived from IPP, which is now included in GVA, must accrue
to one of the factors of production. The implicit assumption the BEA makes is
that all IPP rents accrue to capital. Koh, et al (2018) states that it is this extreme
assumption which generates the secular decline in the labour share - it is purely an
11
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accounting artefact and not an economic phenomenon.
1.3 Methodology
To ensure consistency between empirical estimates and analytical concepts, it is




Where W is average labour compensation per hour worked, L is the total number
of hours worked and Y is a measure total income (Elsby, et al, 2013). Although the
calculation of total income and the total number of hours worked may be relatively
straightforward given current data, the quantification of average labour compensa-
tion per hour worked is more problematic. This is because it includes some labour
income which cannot be observed directly; namely, a portion of proprietor income.
But what exactly is proprietor income? Following the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) definition, proprietor income consists of the earnings derived from: sole
proprietorships, partnerships, and any other private businesses that are organised
for profit but are not classified as corporations (BEA, 2017). While corporations are
obliged to record factor income for legal purposes, unincorporated enterprises are
not required to keep detailed financial accounts in the same way; as such, they can
freely move assets between business and personal accounts. For this reason, it is not
possible to distinguish between the remuneration for work and the entrepreneurial
profit in an unincorporated business. Thus, herein lies a key issue: how should
we account for the labour portion of proprietor income when estimating the labour
share?
Approach 1: One common method used for imputing self-employed labour income
involves calculating average employee compensation (in some form) and scaling it up
to the number of proprietors. This is the well-known approach suggested by Gollin
(2002). It involves calculating average employee compensation and scaling it up to
the total number workers in the economy (employees plus proprietors), then diving











Where C is compensation of employees, E is the total number of employees and
P is the total number of proprietors. Specifically here, Y represents gross value
added (gross domestic product less the value of intermediate consumption: GVA).
There are two main reasons for removing taxes on production less subsidies. Firstly,
although net indirect taxes are levied on production, it is not precisely clear which
factor bears the burden of taxation (Bridgeman, 2014). Secondly, these taxes could
be used for a wide variety of purposes, which may disproportionately benefit capital
or labour income (Lawrence, 2015). The burdens and purposes of indirect taxation
are likely to vary substantially across time; therefore, to reduce potential bias and
noise when constructing factor shares, taxes on production less subsidies are usually
omitted from the denominator.
The LS1 approach has the clear advantage of requiring minimal data to construct.
However, it assumes that, on average, proprietors are compensated for their labour
in equal proportion to employees; regardless of hours worked. This is a significant
weakness for two reasons. Firstly, wage distributions of employees are generally
skewed rightward in developed economies due to the presence of highly paid man-
agerial and financial jobs; a sector of work in which self-employed people generally
do not participate. Therefore, these types of imputation of self-employed labour
income may potentially generate upward bias in estimates of the labour share.2
Secondly, consider a compositional shift from full-time to part-time employment in
the economy. Ceteris paribus, this would lead to a decrease in total employee com-
pensation, since the total number of hours worked by employees has fallen. However,
the total number of employees, part-time and full-time, does not change. As a re-
sult, average employee compensation decreases but average employee compensation
per hour worked remains unchanged. This example merely emphasises that the nu-
merator (employee compensation) depends on both the intensive margin and the
extensive margin while the denominator (number of employees) is expressed purely
2A priori, this could generate bias estimates in either direction if the average employee wages
differs sufficiently from the (unobservable) average proprietor labour income. This issue is
addressed with a novel approach in LS4.
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in terms of the extensive margin.3
Approach 2: A natural solution to this second issue could be to simply express
everything in terms of hours worked (the favoured method of the BLS). This would
fully account for the intensive and extensive margin since employee compensation
would be divided by the number of total hours worked by employees; thereby ab-
sorbing the effects of both margins. This approach would instead yield average
employee compensation per hour worked, which would then be scaled up to the to-
tal number of hours worked (employee hours plus proprietor hours). Dividing this
estimate of total labour income by gross value added gives a modified LS2 version









Where EH is the total number of hours worked by employees and PH is the total
number of hours worked by proprietors. An advantage of this approach is that it
moves closer to the conceptual definition of the labour share LSD by fully accounting
for the intensive margin when imputing self-employed labour income. The assump-
tion here is that, on average, proprietors are compensated for their labour at the
same hourly rate as employees.
However, to construct LS2 requires data on the total hours worked by proprietors;
this can be difficult to gauge since those who are self-employed often do not have
contractually fixed hours of work. Moreover, proprietors may have a greater predis-
position to work additional unrecorded hours by allowing their work time to blur
into their leisure time4.
A disadvantage of the LS2 approach is that it requires additional data to construct,
which usually limits its historical scope. Often, it is the long run behaviour of the
labour share which is of interest to economists for both empirical and theoretical
reasons. Therefore, a possible solution to this issue is to find a middle ground
between the LS1 and LS2 measures, whereby adjustments are made for the intensive
3This ceases to be an problem only if average hours worked per employee are always equal to
average hours worked per proprietor; thereby extinguishing the effect of the intensive margin.
4For example, managing their business accounts while at home in the evening or communicating
with clients outside of usual working hours.
14
1.3 Methodology
margin but historical scope is not excessively restricted.
Approach 3: A potential remedy could be to modify LS1 by utilising full-time
equivalent employees, as opposed to the total number of employees. This allows
for adjustments in the intensive margin by converting the hours worked by part-
time employees into a quantity of full-time employees. For example, consider an
economy with one full-time employee who works 32 hours per week, and two part-
time employees, who both work 16 hours a week each. In this case, the number
of full-time equivalent employees in the economy would be 2 since the total hours
worked by the part-time employees is equivalent to one full-time employee.
For LS3, full-time equivalent employees (FTEE) requires a concrete definition. The
BEA defines full-time equivalent employees as: ‘the product of the total number of
employees [. . . ] and the ratio of average weekly hours per employee for all employees
to average weekly hours per employee on full-time schedules.’ Where a full-time
schedule is defined to be an employee who works ‘on average at least 30 hours per
week’. Furthermore, persons engaged in production (PEIP ) is defined as: ‘full-time










PEIP = FTEE + P
Where EFTH is total hours worked by full-time employees and EFT is the total number









This approach is robust to the aforementioned example whereby a compositional
shift in employee hours worked biases estimates of the labour share. This is because
using FTEE allows for adjustments to be made in the employee intensive margin
through the denominator. However, no adjustments can be made for changes in
the hours worked by the self-employed because of the implicit assumption that all
proprietors are full-time workers (who work, on average, the same weekly hours as
15
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full-time employees). This is because employment is ultimately still expressed in
terms of quantities of workers; average hours worked by part-time employees are
converted into a quantity of full-time employees.
Therefore, the assumption here is that proprietors, on average, are compensated
for their labour in equal proportion to full-time (equivalent) employees5. However,
at least some proprietors are part-time workers, therefore, it is possible that this
measure of the labour share could be upward bias. This is because the equivalent
of a full-time employee’s wage is being assigned to some part-time self-employed
workers; thus inflating the estimate of total proprietor labour income.
On the other hand, we might expect proprietors to possess some type of managerial
or human capital skill that employees do not possess, which would, in theory, allow
them to command a higher return on their labour (Kreuger, 1999). This is also not
captured here, so may downward bias the labour share. Potentially, the net affect of
these biases could cancel out; however, this cannot be verified this in any quantitative
sense without utilising comprehensive micro-survery data. This motivates the LS4
approach put forward here.
Approach 4: A novel method for constructing the labour share could be to estimate
the counter-factual wages of self-employed individuals using micro-level survey data
and incorporating it into the LS2 approach.6 This LS4 approach differs from LS2
insofar it scales the total proprietor hours worked by an average hourly premium;
this computed as follows. Firstly, a standard Mincerian wage equation is constructed
for employees:
ln (Ewage) = αˆ + βˆ1Edu+ βˆ2Age+ βˆ3Age2 + ...+ δˆX
Where ln (Ewage) is the average hourly wage of employees. Here, Age serves as a
proxy for experience and Edu is the number of years of education received by the
individual. X is a vector of additional controls (such as ethnicity, gender, marital
status). The counter-factual wage of each individual proprietor i is then constructed
by fitting the observed self-employed values for education and age (plus other con-
5E ≥ FTEE by definition; as a corollary LS3 ≥ LS1
6To the best of my knowledge I have not seen this approach implemented elsewhere.
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trols) into the estimated equation:
ln (CFPwagei) = αˆ + βˆ1Edui + βˆ2Agei + βˆ3Age2i + ...+ δˆXi
Adjusting for Jensen’s inequality, the log hourly wage estimates for each proprietor i
are transformed back into levels. Summing across all counter-factual wage estimate
and dividing by the number of proprietors in the survey NP yields the average
counter-factual proprietor wage. Constructing the average employee hourly wage,
whereNE is the number of employees, and taking the ratio of the two aforementioned












Where AHP is the relative average hourly premium (or penalty) to being a propri-
etor. This represents the difference in hourly wage that an employee receives relative
to a proprietor; notably the direction of the difference is not restricted (there could







EH + PH × AHP
Y
)
Ultimately, the assumption made here is that employees and proprietors, who have
similar characteristics, on average, receive the same hourly compensation for their
labour. This is a less restrictive assumption than all the aforementioned measures.
In the special case where there is no average hourly premium to being self-employed
AHP = 1, this measure nests that of the BEA (approach LS2). While LS4 con-
stitutes a significant advantage over the aforementioned measures, one drawback is
the implicit assumption of employees and self-employed individuals possessing the
same unobservable characteristics; something which is likely to be untrue (Kruger,
1999). For a more robust approach to LS4 it would be appropriate to adjust for
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non-random distribution of unobservables by using a Heckman selection model - this
attempts to adjust for the decision of individuals to opt in to self-employment.
1.4 Empirical Application
The above measures of the labour share are constructed for the UK economy and are
contrast with the official Office for National Statistics (ONS) measure. The approach
favoured by the ONS simply allocates mixed proprietor income in the same portion
as in the rest of the economy. In other words, the share of labour income is assumed
to be the same in the unincorporated sector as it is in the incorporated sector. This
measure is equivalent to removing ambiguous self-employed income from a measure





Figure 1.1 displays three measures of the UK labour share. The black line is the
official ONS measure, which exhibits a clear decline. The blue and red lines represent
the LS1 and LS2 measures, respectively, and exhibit a less protracted decline.
The official ONS measure displays a clear fall, from approximately 0.68 in the early
1960s to 0.59 in the late 1990s, thereafter it stabilises; nearly a 10 percentage point
fall. The LS1 measure tracks the ONS measure very well until approximately 1975,
afterwards the estimates begin to diverge, and since the 2008 recession the average
gap between these two measures has widened to approximately 5 percentage points.
This gap is reflected in the weak correlation between the percentage of proprietors
in the workforce and the share of mixed income in output post-1975 (shown in
appendix).
The percentage of the UK workforce that was self-employed between 1959 and 1974
varied between 6.8% and 7.8%. However, after 1975 the share of self-employed
people in the workforce rose; in 2016 it was 13.1%. Meanwhile, the share of mixed




Figure 1.1: UK Labour Share (1959-2016) LSONS LS1 LS2
These trends could potentially be explained by the incentives and costs associated
with incorporating businesses. Due to new technology, it is likely that the adminis-
trative costs to incorporation have fallen over time. Additionally, there are increased
tax incentives for small and medium-sized businesses to incorporate. Moreover, the
number of self-employed individuals who work part-time (less than 30 hours per
week) has increased notably - see Appendix. It is likely that these factors have
contributed to a reduction in the average economic output of a given self-employed
proprietorship; thus keeping the share of mixed income in the economy stable, while
the share of self-employed workers has risen.
Clearly, the LS2 measure does not exhibit the same historical scope as the other
two approaches (proprietor hours worked data has only been recorded in the Labour
Force Survey (LFS) since 1992). Moreover, self-employed hours worked are reported
in bands of time, opposed to the exact amount of hours (presumably for reasons
of expediency, since it is likely that proprietor hours will vary a great deal more
than employee hours with the day-to-day flow of business). To bypass this issue, a
simplifying, albeit imperfect, assumption is to suppose that proprietors are normally
distributed within the time bands. This means that the mid-point of each band
represents the average hours worked by proprietors within that given threshold.7
7The top hours worked band is open-ended; however, it will be assumed that no individuals
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Moreover, as LS1 imputes self-employed labour income via the headcount ratio of
employees to proprietors, the gap between LS2 and LS1 represents the intensive
margin. On average, self-employed people work longer hours - this is partially due
to the fact that a significant portion of employees are part-time workers, while much
fewer self-employed people work part time. As a result, both measures have very
similar trends but LS2 is scaled up slightly.
Although it is not possible to extend proprietor hours beyond 1992, a conjecture
(based on changing trends in part-time employment relative to full-time employment
over the past few decades) is that the gap between LS2 and LS1 is likely to have
been small in the early 1960s. If this is the case, the LS2 measure exhibits a smaller
decline, stabilising around 0.65 - which would imply only a 3% drop in the labour
share. We can also support this intuition by examining the LS3 approach.
Figure 1.2: UK Labour Share (1959-2016) LS1 LS2 LS3
First, LS3 measure must be constructed for the UK via the creation of a full-time
equivalent employees series. This is a series which is collected by the BEA but
not the ONS. Instead, UK household survey data from the Living Costs and Food
Survey (LCFS)8 is used to construct full-time equivalent employees. This is an
exceed the UK legal maximum weekly working hours of 48 hours per week (on average over
any given 17 week period).
8Known as the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS) from 2001-2008 and the Family Expenditure
Survey (FES) from 1957-2001.
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annual cross-sectional study which collects a wide range of household-level data,
including information on hours worked. The series is constructed accordingly, the
LCFS asks employees their ‘normal weekly hours [worked]’. Average normal weekly
hours worked for all employees, part-time and full-time, is easily obtained by tak-
ing the mean of all responses to this question. However, average normal weekly
hours worked for only full-time employees must also be calculated. This is done by
separating out full-time employees from part-time employees based on their normal
weekly hours worked. Following the previously specified BEA definition, any em-
ployees who normally works less than 30 hours a week are dropped from the sample.
The mean is then calculated for those remaining in the sample in order to generate
the average normal weekly hours worked for full-time employees only. The ratio of
these two are then multiplied by the number of employees to give the number of full-
time equivalent employees. Persons engaged in production can then be constructed
simply by adding the number proprietors in the survey to this measure.
It can be seen in Figure 1.2, the LS3 measure tracks LS2 remarkably well for the
whole series, with the slight exception of 2009 onward. This could be due to the
increase in part-time self-employment after the Great Recession. Therefore, the
assumption of all self-employed workers being full-time workers in the LS3 approach
may be less realistic post-Great Recession (consider the rise of the gig economy;
Uber, Deliveroo, and other similar platforms). However, the main advantage of
the LS3 measure is that it has greater historical scope for the UK utilising LCFS
data back until 1968. Given this, it could be a reasonable to presume that if the
LS2 measure could be extended backwards, it would likely mirror the LS3 measure
closely.
Additionally, LS3 tracks LS1, fairly closely, with a slight widening of the gap over
time, which reflects the rise in the relative share of part-time employees in the
economy. When comparing the LS1 measure with the LS3 measure, there is more
of an observed decline owing to the fact that the LS1 measure makes no attempt
to adjust for the intensive margin, and therefore underestimates the labour share
when the share of part-time employees in the economy rises (as it has done in the
UK from the mid 1970s onward).
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Figure 1.3 includes the novel approach of LS4 whereby the average hourly premium
to being a self-employed is constructed from LCFS survey data. Counter-factual
estimates suggest that proprietors receive a slightly higher hourly compensation
for their labour, on average, relative to employees. This appears to be due to
compositional effects, for example, self-employed people are overwhelmingly male,
older, white and married. These characteristics are associated with higher hourly
wages among employees.
Figure 1.3: UK Labour Share (1959-2016) LS1 LS2 LS4
When inferring proprietors’ counter-factual wages through this method, it results in
self-employed people having an average hourly premium to their labour (shown in
Appendix). This could also perhaps be rationalised economically as proprietors may
possess some additional managerial or human capital skills which would allow them
to command an above average hourly wage in the labour market if they were to
become an employee. As shown in Figure 1.3, due to the small average hourly pre-
mium, the LS4 measure is slightly higher than the LS2 measure. The gap between
the red line and the yellow line represent the extent to which controlling for differ-
ent characteristics among employees relative to self-employed impacts estimates of
labour income. However, as can be seen, for the most part LS4 closely tracks LS2,
especially before the Great Recession.
However, aside from proprietor income there are other forms of potentially ambigu-
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ous income in the economy. There is some debate surrounding how to apportion
income from different sources, for example intellectual property, or more broadly
put, intangible assets. This is dealt with in the next section.
1.5 Intellectual Property Products
In the context of measuring the labour share, Koh, et al (2018) raise the issue
of how to conceptually classify different types of expenditure in the economy, in
particular, intellectual property products. They note that IPPs have previously
been considered as an intermediate input, but recently have been reclassified by the
BEA as investments.
Figure 1.4: Reclassification of IPP in National Accounts
This reclassification is important because the decision to include IPP as investment
revises up the value of GVA and revises down the value of intermediate inputs. A
portion of intermediate inputs has been reallocated to GVA. This unambiguously
increases GVA and increases the value of the denominator when constructing the
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labour share (from a purely accounting perspective, this lowers the value of the
labour share). However, to ensure that the accounting identity in Figure 1.4 holds,
any income derived from IPP, which is now included in GVA, must accrue to one of
the factors of production. The portion of this reclassified income which is attributed
to capital is denoted as χ. The implicit assumption the BEA makes is that all IPP
rents accrue to capital χ = 1 (IPP is fully capitalised). Koh, et al (2018) argue
that it is this extreme assumption which creates the appearance of a decline in the
labour share. The share of IPPs in gross investment in the US has been steadily
increasing over the past few decades, by construction under these assumptions, the
labour share has fallen.
In the UK system of national accounts IPPs (non-physical assets, formerly known as
intangibles) are defined as software, research and development (R&D), artistic orig-
inals and mineral exploration. Research and development expenditure (the largest
component of IPPs in the UK) has only been capitalised in ONS national account
since 2014. This is in keeping with ESA and international best practice, and reflects
similar accounting changes which occurred in the US for the BEA.
In the UK, the share of IPPs in aggregate gross fixed capital formation rose from ap-
proximately 4% in 1970 to 20% in 2015. The growing share of IPP emphasises their
increasing importance the UK economy. However, by assuming that all IPP rents by
default accrue to capital income could be misleading. Koh, et al (2018) argue that
R&D workers often obtain incentive stock options as part of their compensation.
Additionally, the R&D developed by workers may allow firms to be more competi-
tive or induce higher productivity which raises workers marginal product and their
wages; therefore, part of the returns to R&D could accrue to labour. Moreover, Koh,
et al (2018) mentions that proprietors may spend time developing advertisement or
branding their business, which could be considered as IPP, and which can gener-
ate returns for their enterprise (part of these returns ought be considered labour
income).
The same approach that Koh, et al (2018) apply to the US data is applied to the UK.
Below is the counter-factual case whereby IPP is removed from GVA and reclassified
as an intermediate input (the capitalisation of IPP is undone). Specifically:
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LSIPPONS =
C
Y −M − IPP
Where IPP represents gross investment in intellectual property products.
Figure 1.5: UK Labour Share (1959-2016) LSONS LSIPPONS
The implicit assumption of undoing the capitalisation of IPP is that IPP rents are
apportioned between capital and labour in the same ratio as the rest of the economy
(thus treating them in the same manner as mixed proprietor income). As shown
in Figure 1.5, the removal of IPPs from output dampens the decline in the labour
share. This is reflected in the divergence between the two measures over time and
the two fitted trend lines with differing gradients. From an accounting perspective
this is completely logical given that the share of gross IPP expenditure in investment
has been increasing steadily in the UK since 1970.
However, Koh, et al (2018) do not focus explicitly on the issue of proprietor income.
Changing trends in self-employment are significant and should not be downplayed.
The approach below combines the LS3 measure with the IPP approach of Koh, et
al (2018).
Firstly, the self-employed labour income is imputed, and then half of the IPP rents
are attributed to labour following the benchmark assumption of McGrattan and
Prescott (2014) χ = 0.5. The combined effect of these two approach can be seen for
the UK in Figure 1.6, specifically:
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LSIPP3 =
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However, there is an additional assumption here beyond the standard LS3 approach.
The fraction of IPP rents allocated to full-time employees as assumed to be in the
same proportion as self-employed persons. It can be seen that, once adjustments
are made for IPP rents and proprietors, the labour share in the UK exhibits essen-
tially no decline from 1970 until 2016, remaining on average at approximately 0.64,
reflected by the dashed trend line in blue on Figure 1.6. The black line represents
the LSONS measure where no additional adjustment are made; it is the same as the
series in the previous figures, but truncated at 1970 (simply for convenience because
data for IPP investments prior to 1970 is not available).
Figure 1.6: UK Labour Share (1970-2016) LSONS LSIPP3
Comparing the trend lines, it can be shown that the ONS measure shows a sub-
stantial decline in the labour share over the period shown, partially due to the
increasing share of investments in IPPs, and partially due to the changing structure




When empirically estimating the labour share, researchers inevitably have to make
qualitative assumptions regarding the classification and apportioning of incomes.
While such qualitative assumptions cannot be evaluated directly in any quantitative
sense, through careful and reasonable argumentation it is possible to arrive at a
conceptually cleaner estimates of the labour share. Given that the labour share
plays a fundamental role as a parameter in macroeconomic models and motivates
a growing body of literature, it is no longer justifiable to brush aside such broad
qualitative assumptions when they clearly have profound quantitative impacts. The
output of structural models, and any economic insights we derive from them are
only valid insofar that analytical concepts actually correspond to what we suppose
they do; as opposed to what we would like them to - usually for sake the expediency
or tractability.
This paper covers some of these key issues and examines the role of proprietor income
in close detail. It uses survey data from the LCFS to provide a novel approach
to estimating the labour share in the UK in a more conceptually accurate way.
Alongside this it also considers the role of intellectual property product classification
and how the rise in the share of investment of intangibles has impacted the labour
share in the UK. This paper demonstrates that the careful treatment of proprietor
income and intellectual property products suggests there has been little to no decline
in the labour share in the UK. This is in line with a growing body of literature, such
as Bridgeman (2018) and Koh, et al (2018), which questions the credibility of the
secular decline of the labour share, which has gathered significant attention in recent
years.
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1.7 Appendix
This appendix contains some supporting data for the labour share measures con-
structed in section 1.4.
Figure 1.7: UK Propietors and Mixed Income (1959-2016) P/ (E + P )M/Y
Figure 1.7 shows that the share of mixed proprietor income in the economy has
remained stable over time. However, the share of the total workforce who are self-
employed has increased since around the mid-1970s. This suggests that the average
economic output of a proprietorship has been falling since around 1975. This ex-
plains the divergence between LSONS and LS1 shown in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.8: LCFS: Share of UK Employees Working Part-Time (1968-2016)
From Figure 1.8 data from the LCFS shows that the percentage of employees who
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work part-time has been growing steadily, increasing from approximately 15% in
1968 to 28% in 2016. This emphasises the importance of controlling for the employee
intensive margin when imputing self-employed labour income - exemplified by the
divergence in the LS1 and LS3 measures in Figure 1.2. It also provides empirical
support for using full-time equivalent employees over a simple headcount measure
when constructing the labour share.
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2 Rising Firm Markups and Optimal
Capital Taxation
Abstract
The Chamley-Judd result states that the taxation of capital income should converge
to zero in the long run. This paper develops a simple model of firm entry and opti-
mal taxation which demonstrates that, when a fiscal authority cannot differentiate
between two sources of capital income, a positive capital tax may be optimal in the
steady state. In this setting it is assumed there are two types of capital stock; firm
capital and physical capital. The government would like to tax windfall gains as
lump-sum profits derived from firms do not impact the decisions of agents at the
margin. However, the government wishes to avoid the taxation of physical capital
because they do not want to discourage productive future investments. These two
opposing objectives must be reconciled with a single flat-rate tax on capital τK .
Moreover, recent empirical studies suggest that average firm-level markups have in-
creased substantially over the past two decades; a direct implication is a rise in the
share of aggregate profits. In a structural framework, for an empirically plausible
set of parameters, it is shown that when markups µ or firm-level decreasing returns
(1− ν) are sufficiently high, aggregate profits in equilibrium become large enough
such that it is optimal to positively tax capital income in the long run.
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2.1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies suggest that average firm-level markups have increased
substantially over the past two decades (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). Rising
average firm markups increase prices and reduce output; a direct implication is a rise
in the share of aggregate profits (Autor, et al, 2017). Theoretically, the existence of
aggregate profits indicates the presence of rent in the economy and a deviation away
from the first-best. Under a structural framework, the taxation of pure rental in-
come is non-distortionary, and therefore it is efficient to tax windfall profits at 100%
for the purposes of financing public expenditures; equivalent to a lump-sum tax be-
cause it does not impact the decisions of agents at the margin (Guo and Lansing,
1999). While the theoretical appeal of pure rent taxation is widely acknowledged
and understood, in practical terms it is not so straightforward (Stiglitz, 1987). A
key reason for this is identification issues. Total capital income is potentially com-
prised of many component sources, such as; rent, corporate profits, net interest and
a fraction of proprietor income; not all of which is directly observable. Distilling
aggregate profits from this bundle requires qualitative assumptions to be made re-
garding the classification and apportioning incomes - assumptions which cannot be
evaluated directly.
Given the difficulties that a government may face regarding the classification of
capital income for the purposes of unmitigated taxation of windfall gains, this paper
imposes the modelling notion that the fiscal authority cannot differentiate between
different sources of capital income, namely; profits derived from firm capital and
interest derived from physical capital. The inclusion of firm capital following Bilbiie,
et al (2012) introduces monopolistic competition, markups and rental income, in the
form of aggregate profits. This subsequently motivates the research question of this
paper: is it efficient to tax capital in the long run when the government possess only
a single fiscal tool with which to tax two differing types of capital income?
The results of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) both state that it is optimal to
tax capital at zero percent in the long run. Their renowned result emphasises the
highly distortionary nature of capital taxation and suggests that it does not appear
to serve as a useful tool in equilibrium for either efficiency or redistributive purposes.
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This paper revisits the Chamley-Judd result in the context of rising firm markups.
Estimates of average markups weighted by firm-level sales for the US economy are
reproduced below from De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).
Figure 2.1: Average US Firm Markups (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017)
It can clearly be seen that since 1980 average markups have shown a secular up-
ward trend; this directly affects the distribution of factor income. Ceteris paribus,
markups are positively linked to aggregate profits. This has clear implication for
welfare and resource allocation in a general equilibrium framework. This paper ex-
amines the impacts of rising markups on the optimal taxation of capital (and labour)
income.
A single flat-rate capital tax which must be used to raise revenue from firm capi-
tal (profits) and physical capital (interest) establishes two opposing fiscal objectives
Firstly, there is the ‘profit effect’: the government would like to tax windfall gains
at 100% since lump-sum profits derived from firms do not impact the decisions of
agents at the margin. Secondly, there is the ‘under-investment effect’: the govern-
ment would like to tax physical capital at 0% since they do not wish to discourage
productive future investments in physical capital.1
These two effects pull in opposite directions but must be reconciled with a single
capital tax rate in equilibrium. The paper evaluates the direct impact of markups
(and returns to scale) on the optimal taxation of capital (and labour) income in the
long run. When markups rise, aggregate profits in equilibrium increase. Beyond a
1These two ‘effect’ terms are taken from Gao and Lasing (1999)
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certain threshold it becomes efficient to positively tax capital in equilibrium as the
‘profit effect’ is dominates the ‘under-investment effect’. Numerical simulations of
steady state expressions yield boundary conditions for when the long run capital
tax flips from zero to positive. However, if markups are low the ‘under-investment
effect’ becomes large and the original Chamley-Judd result is recovered; capital is
taxed at zero percent and labour bears the full burden of taxation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 sets up the model in the context of the aforementioned literature. Section
4 solves for steady states, the optimal capital and labour tax rates, and discusses
the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. The appendix derives the conditions for
the optimal tax rates in full.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper brings together two strands of literature; optimal taxation and firm dy-
namics. The most acclaimed and contentious finding in the literature of optimal
taxation is the Chamley-Judd result. Judd (1985) questions whether capital tax-
ation is optimal for redistributive purposes in a two-agent economy with workers
and capitalists. The former supplies labour and derives income from wages and
government transfers (funded by taxes on capital), the latter only invests and earns
income from capital. The conclusion is that if both workers and capitalists have
the same rate of time preference, the optimal redistributive tax on capital income,
from the point of view of either agent, is zero in the steady state. Chamley (1986)
asks whether it is efficient to tax capital in an infinite horizon representative agent
framework where the government must finance an exogenous sequence of purchases
with access to unconstrained debt. The outcome is that, the taxation of capital
income converges to zero in the long run because any small change in its price will
generate large sub-optimal responses in steady state capital accumulation. This is
because the return on capital in the steady state is pinned down by the discount
factor; this implies that the supply of capital is perfectly elastic with respect to its
price in the long run.
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Moreover, the Chamley-Judd result has been shown to hold even when some as-
sumptions have been relaxed. For example, Atkenson, et al (1999) confirms that it
holds in an economy with heterogeneous consumers, who differ in terms of consump-
tion and labour supply, and can be taxed at different rates. Additionally, Atkenson,
et al (1999) also shows that an optimal zero capital tax is consistent with an over-
lapping generations framework, provided the utility function exhibits homothetic
preferences and is additively separable. Furthermore, Judd (1999) allows for pro-
duction functions which contain public goods and non-stationarity. This set up still
generates the result of an optimal zero capital tax in the long run, even if the capital
stock does not converge to a unique steady state or balanced growth path.
However, the Chamley-Judd result is neither universally commended or straight-
forward in its interpretation. Others have challenged its robustness and demon-
strate that it does not hold when differing assumptions are relaxed. For example,
Jones, et al (1993) construct a Ramsey plan where government revenues gt con-
tribute directly to investment in capital stock, such as infrastructure or public good
spending. They abstract from labour entirely to simply focus on the capital ac-
cumulation process. Investments from private agents and the government enter
symmetrically into the formation of capital stock which depreciates at a single fixed
rate kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + f (it, gt). Under this framework, pure profits are generated
due to presence of the government investment and the limiting capital tax converges
to a strictly positive value in the steady state.
Moreover, Aiyagari (1995) establishes that in an economy with ex-post heterogeneity
due to uninsured idiosyncratic risk, the steady state optimal tax rate on capital is
positive. This is because incomplete markets create a motive for precautionary
savings, in turn this leads to excessive capital accumulation as a means of self-
insurance which places downward pressure on the rental rate. A positive capital
tax can mitigate this ‘over-accumulation’ by pushing up the net-tax rental rate and
bringing it closer in line with the unconstrained first-best rental rate, which is pinned
down by the discount factor.
Correia (1996) illustrates that the Chamley-Judd result is contingent on the gov-
ernment’s ability to tax all factors of production. For example, given a production
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function homogeneous of degree one with three inputs (capital, labour and some
additional factor) where restrictions are imposed on the taxation of the additional
factor, the tax rate on capital income will generally be non-zero in the steady state.
The sign of the tax will depend on whether the two remaining factors are comple-
ments (positive) or substitutes (negative) to capital. Furthermore, Guo and Lansing
(1999) show that the introduction of firm monopoly power in product markets cre-
ates the possibility of a non-zero optimal capital tax in the long run, the sign and
magnitude of which depends crucially on the degree of monopoly power and the
extent to which monopoly profits can be independently taxed.
In an infinite horizon representative agent framework Abel (2007) demonstrates that,
in complete contrast to the Chamley-Judd result, a constant positive capital tax and
a zero labour tax can optimal for financing government purchases. However, this
result is entirely due to the inclusion of capital allowances; agents can deduct capital
expenditures from taxable capital income. An appropriate fixed tax on capital
with contemporaneous expenditure deductions does not impact the optimal path
of capital accumulation. As such, it can be used to finance government purchases
in a non-distortionary way; this accounting practice essentially creates lump-sum
taxation, which enables a first-best outcome.
Carlos, et al (2009) construct an overlapping generations model with uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk and heterogeneity in labour productivity. They find that ex-ante
(prior to ability being realised) welfare is higher with positive labour and capital
taxation. Due to the life-cycle structure of the model, relative to an infinite horizon
structure, capital taxation is less distortionary in the limit. This amplifies the
mechanism in Aiyagari (1995) and generates significantly positive optimal capital
taxation. This suggests that capital taxation is an efficient tool for redistributive
purposes in the face of incomplete markets.
Straub and Werning (2015) revisit the Chamley-Judd result and demonstrate that
it does not necessarily hold in either of the original frameworks if some specifications
are altered slightly. Firstly, in Judd (1985), if capitalist exhibit an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) below unity, the capital tax does not approach zero,
but instead converges towards a positive value. This is because anticipated increases
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in future capital taxes raise the net-rental rate and induces higher levels of invest-
ment today. This generates a higher capital stock over the transition period which is
optimally exploited with an increasing tax on capital, which eventually convergence
to a stable steady state. Secondly, in Chamley (1986), if the IES is below unity and
the initial stock of government debt is sufficiently large, then for any starting value
K0, the optimal solution will be to tax capital income at 100% indefinitely at the
upper bound. This result can even occur when the existing stock of debt is slightly
below the feasible maximum tax burden which agents can finance.
In response, Chari, et al (2016) suggests that incomplete taxation drives the findings
of Straub and Werning (2015) and that significant gains to welfare, as well as the
original zero capital tax result, can be recovered if a consumption tax is introduced.
They argue that any large existing stock of government debt can instead be dealt
with by a sizable tax on consumption immediately after the initial period. This is
because a consumption tax is not subject to a natural upper bound of 100% and
therefore the whole term structure with the capital tax rate binding indefinitely at
the upper bound will not be exploited. In this framework, after the first few periods,
labour and consumption are taxed at uniform rates and the capital tax remains at
zero for all subsequent periods.
Another strand of literature, which intersects with the theme of this paper, is con-
cerned with the role of the firm in the macroeconomy. The seminal paper of Bil-
biie, et al (2012) models firm dynamics in structural framework and finds that
firm markups play a key role in matching appropriate cross-correlations and second
moments of macroeconomic aggregates. This has subsequently motivated studies
which attempt to empirically gauge and understand the underlying causes for shift-
ing markups.
For example, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) utilise firm-level panel data to con-
struct average markups for the US economy. Markups are constructed from indi-
vidual producers as a wedge between input expenditure shares and their respective
output elasticities - which are obtained by estimating firm production functions.
Individual firm markups are then weighted by firm sales for the US economy to
obtain a measure of average markups. They find a substantial increase in markups
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from 1.18 in 1980 to 1.67 in 2014 and argue that this can account for perceived
secular trends in macroeconomics, such a declining labour share and output growth
slowdown.
Hall (2018) takes different approach by calculating marginal cost as the ratio of the
adjusted expenditure on inputs to the adjusted change in output; the findings are
consistent with De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) insofar that both estimate rising
markups over approximately the past two decades. However, they differ in terms of
respective magnitudes; Hall (2018) estimates a lower markup ratio in 2015 of 1.38.
In addition, Barkai (2018) examines the distribution of factor income and finds
that labour and capital shares have been declining in the US, while the share in
pure profits, primarily driven by rising markups, has been increasing. Extending
estimates of capital costs by industry, the author finds that the share of profits
in gross value added has been steadily rising since the early 1980s. These findings
provide a strong motivation for studying the role of markups in the context of general
equilibrium optimal taxation.
2.3 Model
A standard representative agent model, in the framework of Chamley (1986) is aug-
mented to include firm entry and imperfect taxation. One small alteration from
this original set up is that the government does not have access to unconstrained
borrowing. However, as this paper is concerned with the impact of firms on long
run optimal taxation, this difference is trivial as government borrowing only im-
pacts the transition path to the steady state. The model in this paper incorporates
elements of Corria (1996) insofar that there exists some element of incomplete tax-
ation. However, this due to the government being unable to discriminate between
income from firm capital and physical capital, as opposed to the outright restriction
of taxation of a third factor. Moreover, in Corria (1996) the third factor is remu-
nerated at the competitive rate, whereas here the introduction of firm capital, with
monopolistic competition moves, away from the framework of perfectly competitive
markets. Additionally, the model developed here adopts a feature found in Guo
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and Lasing (1999) where the fiscal authority cannot distinguish between profits and
other capital income for the purposes of taxation. However, this paper differs insofar
that Guo and Lasing (1999) do not model the role of firms explicitly and do not
directly explore the impact markups and firm-level returns to scale together on long
run optimal taxation.
The model is kept simple in order to derive tractable analytical solutions (shown
in Appendix). The consumer side of the problem begins with a simple standard
log-log utility function. The infinitely lived representative agent derives utility from
consumption Ct (which comprises of a basket of differentiated goods) and leisure
(1− Lt) (where the total number of hours available is normalised to unity). The
agent maximises lifetime utility subject to the constraints (2.1) through (2.4) where




t {ψ lnCt + (1− ψ) ln (1− Lt)}
In any given period the consumer derives utility from a collection of goods which are
aggregated into a single basket of goods Ct. The CES aggregator is as follows, where









The markup is independent of varieties produced and purely a function of the elastic-
ity of substitution µ = γ
γ−1 . The representative agent faces the following constraints
and chooses Ct, Kt+1, and Lt. Firm entry remains exogenous in the sense that a con-
stant fraction of transfer income is invested into firm capital each period, therefore
Nt+1 is not a direct choice variables for the agent in the maximisation problem.
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Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Tt (2.1)
Gt + Tt = wtLtτ lt + (rtKt + pitNt) τ kt (2.2)
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + It (2.3)
Yt = wtLt + rtKt + pitNt (2.4)
Nt+1 = (1− δn)Nt + Et (2.5)
φTt = Et (2.6)
The government raises revenue each period by taxing labour and capital in order
to fund government purchases Gt and transfer payments Tt. As can be seen from
equation (2.2), the capital tax rate cannot discriminate between income derived from
physical capital and income derived from firm capital. Each period the government
raises enough revenue to finance the exogenous sequence of purchases which does
not contribute to utility and constitutes a fixed fraction of output Gt
Yt
= θ. They
also engage in taxation to fund transfers to households, a portion φ of which is then
invested in new firms; as shown in equation (2.6); the firm entry decision is not
modelled explicitly.
The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, for simplicity, in order to derive tractable
steady state expressions for tax thresholds. Secondly, keeping firm entry exogenous
allows emphasis to be placed on the lump-sum aspect of profit derived from firm
capital - from this a sharp and clear distinction can be drawn between the ‘profit
effect’ and ‘under-investment effect’.2. The first order conditions for the consumer
problem are as follows:
2Without markups each factor gets paid its marginal product. At the firm-level there are de-
creasing returns ν < 1. Therefore, when µ = 1 (perfect substitutability γ = ∞) the aggregate
income generated by firms is (1− ν)Y . Rent derived from profits occurs when firms have some





− λt = 0 (2.7)













− λt + βλt+1
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Combining equations (2.7) and (2.8) gives the labour-leisure optimality condition
while substituting equations (2.8) into (2.9) yields the consumption-Euler equation
(equilibrium conditions are detailed in Table 2.1 below). The capital tax appears in
the labour first order condition (2.8) because the mark up redistributes some income
from labour to firms due to monopoly power; as the capital tax cannot discriminate
between firm capital and physical capital, this additional wedge is driven into the
first order condition for (2.8).
The aggregate production technology is as follows in equation (2.10) where α ∈ (0, 1)
is the physical capital output elasticity, ω ∈ (0, 1) is the labour output elasticity:3
Yt = N1−νt Kαt Lωt (2.10)
However, due to the existence of decreasing returns to scale ν < 1, the firm-level
production technology differs from the aggregate production technology. Dividing
through both sides by Nt, where lower case letters represent firm-level values, the
firm level production function is yt = kαt lωt . The firm’s problem involves choosing
optimal capital and labour inputs for profit maximisation. First order conditions













3ν = α + ω represents firm-level returns to scale. ν = 1 implies constant returns; firms play no
explicit role in production. ν < 1 implies decreasing returns; if a given quantity of capital and
labour input were to be spread over a larger number of firms it would increase output.
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Collecting equations (2.1) through (2.13), the equilibrium conditions for the economy
are detailed in Table 2.1. As can be seen from the government budget constraint
the fiscal authority must raise a fraction of output to finance a stream of exogenous
purchases and transfers, using only direct flat taxes on capital and labour. However,
as there are two classes of capital stock, but only a single capital tax with which
to raise revenue from these sources, two opposing fiscal objectives which must be
reconciled with only a single fiscal tool.
Table 2.1: Equilibrium Conditions
Model Equations
Labour Supply (1−ψ)Ct(1−Lt)ψ((1−τ lt)+(µυ−1)(1−τkt ))
= wt
Labour Demand wt = ωµ
Yt
Lt








Physical Capital Demand rt = αµ
Yt
Kt
Physical Capital Law of Motion Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + It
Firm Capital Law of Motion Nt+1 = (1− δN)Nt + Et
Entry (Firm Capital Investment) φTt = Et
Production Function Yt = N1−νKαLω
Government Budget Gt + Tt = wtLtτLt + (rtKt + pitNt) τKt
Income Accounting Identity Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Tt







The government would like to tax firm profits at confiscatory levels due to the, as
previously highlighted, ‘profit effect’. However, taxation of physical capital is highly
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distortionary, as demonstrated by the Chamley-Judd result; a positive tax on capital
income will create an ‘under-investment effect’. The trade-off is between these two
effects. Solving for the steady states and optimal tax rates is as follows.
2.4 Solution and Results
Dropping time subscripts for endogenous variables and rearranging equations yields
the steady state expressions as functions of parameters; this is shown in Table 2.2.
Note that the flat-rate capital and labour taxes are treated as exogenous up until
this point, their optimal value has not yet been determined. While it is possible
to make both tax rates endogenous for all t via an auxiliary maximisation problem
(Ramsey plan approach; the government chooses tax rates which maximise lifetime
utility subject to the households optimality conditions and constraints), this paper
focuses instead on long run equilibrium outcomes. This allows for greater param-
eter sensitivity analysis and for optimal tax threshold expressions (see Appendix).
Thus, endogenous short run tax dynamics are put to one side, in favour of a deeper
evaluation of optimal tax rates in the long run. The approach put forward here is
analogous to the ‘golden rule’ for the savings rate in the Solow model; it ensures that
the long run optimal tax rates are found subject to the other parameters remaining
constant; however, this approach is general enough that one could potentially ex-
amine the direct impact of any given parameter of interest on welfare maximising
steady state allocations.
The long run optimal rates of taxation of capital and labour income can be ob-
tained by maximising steady state utility. Substituting in the relevant expressions
from Table 2.1 for labour and output, and rearranging, it can be seen that steady
state consumption and steady state labour are both functions of the parameter set
(including the tax rates; which are yet to be determined:
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Table 2.2: Steady State Expressions
Steady States








































































































































































































Note that from the numerator in equation (2.15), that positive taxation is required
to finance the exogenous sequence of purchases and guarantee the existence of a








τ k − θ
)
< 0 and therefore C < 0 (implying negative consumption).
As steady state consumption cannot be negative, the first-best scenario of zero
distortionary taxes (or purely lump-sum taxes) must be ruled out. The constrained
second-best must be found to ensure the existence of equilibrium; this is approached
in the following way. Substitute the analytical expressions from (2.14) and (2.15)
into the steady state utility function U (dropping time subscripts). Long run welfare
44
2.4 Solution and Results
U is now formulated as an explicit function of the parameter set and tax rates:
U = ψ lnC + (1− ψ) ln (1− L)
U = f
(
α, β, δk, δn, θ, µ, φ, ψ, ω, τ
l, τ k
) (2.16)
Amusing that all parameters are fixed constants, the steady state function for welfare
can be reduced to two arguments of interest U = f
(
τ l, τ k
)
. In order to maximise
long run welfare, the partial derivatives of (2.16) must be taken with respect to the
labour tax rate τ l and the capital tax rate τ k. This creates two first order condi-
tions for solving the constrained second-best; from these expressions, the welfare
maximising tax rates can be recovered. Setting these two first partial derivatives
equal to zero and solving the system of equations returns the two optimal tax rates.
This is akin to finding optimal consumption in a simple Solow model via the ‘golden
rule’ and it can be applied to potentially any parameter of interest.
∂U




∂τ l 2 < 0
∂2U















Provided the three expressions above in (2.17) are met, the constrained second-best
is obtained. The two first order conditions above ensure steady state welfare is
unchanging with respect to both tax rates, the negativity of the two second order
partial derivatives ensures utility is being maximised, and the last condition ensures
a global maximum and not a saddle point. In order to compute the optimal tax
rates and analyses the results, parameter values must first be specified.
The list of parameters and their assigned values are displayed in Table 2.3. The
majority of parameter values listed are standard in the literature; most are derived
from King and Rebelo (1999) or Bilbiie, et al (2012).
The remaining parameter values are as follows. The fraction of transfers φ which
households invest in firm capital is chosen, for simplicity, as one-half (this could
also be interpreted as a fixed cost of entry, where φ = 1 would imply costless firm
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Table 2.3: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
β Subjective Discount Factor 0.99
δK Capital Depreciation Rate 0.025
δN Firm Exit Rate 0.025
ψ Consumption-Leisure weight 0.5
φ Firm Transfers Investment Rate 0.5
θ Exogenous Sequence Ratio 0.1
α Physical Capital Output Elasticity 0.29-0.32
ω Labour Output Elasticity 0.51-0.63
γ Goods Elasticity of Substitution 2-4
entry). The exogenous sequence ratio θ is set such that ten percent of output must
be raised every period by the fiscal authority for government purchases (which do
not contribute to utility). The physical capital and labour output elasticities are
varied between their respective values shown in Table 1.3 in order to show a range of
plausible values for (1− ν), (between 0.8 and 0.95) which is determined residually
as ν = α+ ω. The elasticity of substitution is varied between 2 and 4 to reflect the
range of empirical estimates of average firm markups in the literature (implying µ
between 1 and 2).
The calibration in table 2.3 refers to quarterly parameter values. However, as this
paper is primarily concerned with the impact of firms on long run optimal taxation,
this choice is trivial. Steady states are are ultimately unaffected by the decision to
use quarterly parameter values as the subjective discount factor and the deprecation
rates are adjusted such that steady states do not change (while all other parameter
values remain invariant to timing denominations).
Naturally, the main two parameters of interest are the markup and the returns to
scale. Here, (1− ν) represent the firm-aggregate output elasticity. This can also
be interpreted as the firm-level returns to scale; as ν increases, firm-level returns to
scale increases; a given quantity of capital and labour, spread over more firms, will
impact aggregate output less if ν is high.
Figure 2.2 displays the results for the optimal tax rates varying these two parameters
of interest. The horizontal x-axis varies the firm-level returns to scale while the
shaded colours denote different values for the markup. The dashed lines correspond
to the labour tax rate on the left vertical y-axis and the solid lines correspond to
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the capital tax rate on the right horizontal y-axis.
Figure 2.2: Long Run Optimal Tax Rates
As illustrated, the capital and labour tax rates both increase steadily when decreas-
ing returns to scale intensify (moving rightward along the x-axis) with a notable kink
in the function. When (1− ν) rises so does income accruing to firms; the labour and
capital shares falls. In order for the government to maintain financing the exogenous
sequence of purchases, the tax rate on labour must rise in order to compensate for
the reduction in the labour income tax base.
As the aggregate share of profits increases with (1− ν), the marginal product
of physical capital falls and the profit effect is strengthens vis-à-vis the under-
investment effect. Beyond a certain threshold the efficiency gains from taxing lump-
sum profits outweigh the distortion caused by inadvertently taxing future invest-
ments in physical capital. This threshold is denoted by the kink in the steady state
tax functions in Figure 2.2. where the capital tax switches from zero to positive.
After this point the tax rate on labour rises more slowly as its burden is shared with
capital.
It can also be seen that the markup interacts with firm-level returns to scale; the
capital tax becomes positive at a lower threshold of (1− ν) when the markup is
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higher. Three reasonable values for µ are shown, broadly in line with the empirical
estimate for the US economy. From Figure 2.2. it can be seen that as firm markups
rise, the relative tax burdens shift; the taxation of capital income increases while
the taxation of labor income increases at a slower rate. This is because the markup
is determined exclusively by the elasticity of substitution between goods. Higher
markups are indicative of greater monopoly power, which directly increase the share
of rental income in the economy and necessarily reduces the labour share. This
further drives a wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage rate
which is subsequently offset by shifting the relative tax burden away from labour
and towards capital.
Additionally, Figure 1.3 illustrates the relationship between markups, firm-level re-
turns to scale, and the optimal capital tax rate.
Figure 2.3: Long Run Optimal Capital Tax Isoquants
The welfare maximising capital tax rate is labelled next to each tax isoquant. From
Figure 2.3 it can clearly be seen that to sustain some given optimal level of long run
optimal taxation, there is a trade off between µ and returns to scale (1− ν); as both
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of these contribute to the aggregate profit share. As the fiscal authority cannot
differentiate between profits from firm capital and interest from physical capital.
For example, given the parameter values in Table 2.3, combined with µ = 1.6 and
(1− ν) = 0.15 (plasuable values, in line with the aforementioned literature cited for
the US) is enough to generate a small positive tax on capital income in the long run.
2.5 Conclusion
The Chamely-Judd result continually proves to be a topic of interest for economists,
both for theoretical and practical reasons. Recent studies such as, Chari, et al (2016)
maintain that the result should be taken seriously in terms of guiding tax policy;
even arguing that there are significant welfare gains, in excess of any transitional
costs, of adopting a zero capital tax policy. However, important work by Straub
and Werning (2019), advises against this and demonstrates the shaky foundation
of the original result. Moreover, Aiyagari (1995), Correia (1996), Gao and Lansing
(1999), Abel (2007), and Carlos, et al (2009) all provide modest extensions and and
show why the zero capital result may not hold; subsequently, casting doubt on it as
a practical policy recommendation.
This paper adds to that literature by demonstrating that if the government cannot
easily differentiate between two sources of capital income; namely, profits derived
from firm capital and interest derived from physical capital, a positive capital tax
may be optimal in the steady state. The addition of firm capital explicitly models
the role of firms in the production process. Accordingly, important observed eco-
nomic phenomena, such as rising markups, can be studied in a structural setting
in conjunction with optimal taxes. This paper finds that, for benchmark parame-
ter values, empirical estimates of average firm markups in the US are sufficient to
generate a positive tax on capital in equilibrium.
Therefore, despite the simple representative agent structure, a capital tax is efficient
in the long run for the purpose of financing government purchases provided the profit
share is sufficiently high. However, whether increases in the aggregate profits are
driven by firm markups µ or firm-level returns to scale (1− ν) determines the relative
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and absolute burdens of taxation between capital and labour. A ceteris paribus
decrease in firm-level returns to scale causes the taxation of capital and labour
income to both increases steadily. However, as firm markups rise, the relative tax
burdens shift; the taxation of capital income increases while the taxation of labor
income decreases. This is because the markup is determined exclusively by the
elasticity of substitution between goods. Therefore, higher markups are indicative
of greater monopoly power, which directly increase the share of rental income in the
economy and necessarily decreases the labour share of income. This subsequently
shifts the steady state tax burden away from labour and towards capital when µ
rises.
Recent studies suggests that the profit share is increasing in the US economy (Gutier-
rez, 2017) and that this shift appears to be primarily driven by rising firm markups
(Autor, et al 2019). Furthermore, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) empirically de-
termine that average firm markups in the US economy have been on an upward
trajectory for approximately the past few decades. If this perceived secular trend
continues, the argument for the taxation of capital income is strengthened, in the
context of the results established in this paper. While optimal capital levels of
taxation remain a largely open question in economics for practical purposes, par-
ticularity given the current emphasis on inequality and heterogeneity in economics,
acknowledging the results established here, alongside the aforementioned literature,
it appears increasingly difficult to interpret the original Chamley-Judd result as




This appendix derives the analytical first order conditions which the long run welfare
optimising tax rates can be recovered from. Returning to the steady state expres-
sions, it can be seen that substituting equation (14) and (15) into (16) will formulate
steady state welfare U exclusively in terms of the parameters (and the tax rates).
Written explicitly:
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Assuming that all parameters are fixed constants, the steady state function for
welfare is reduced to two arguments U = f
(
τ l, τ k
)
. In order to maximise long run
welfare, the partial derivatives of U must be taken with respect to the labour tax
rate τ l and the capital tax rate τ k. Setting these two partial derivatives equal to
zero and solving the system of equations returns the two optimal tax rates. Taking
the first order partial derivative of U with respect to τ l by repeatedly using the


































































Setting the above equation equal to zero ensures that steady state welfare at this
point is unchanging with respect to the labour tax rate. The same steps are repeated
for the second argument, the first order partial derivative of U with respect to τ k is
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The two first order conditions above constitute a system of equations with two un-
knowns τ l, τ k. These expressions cannot be solved simply by substitution, instead
numerical solution methods are used to find the pair of tax rates which simultane-
ously satisfy the two expressions above; from this the optimal tax thresholds can be
determined, as illustrated in figure 1.3. These expressions allow for a more direct
analysis of long-run optimal taxation, as the impact of each parameter on welfare
maximising tax rates can be seen directly. The impact of any combination of pa-
rameters on steady state allocations can be easily and directly calculated from this
point.
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3 Investment Shocks, Firm
Dynamics and the Comovement
Problem
Abstract
Investment shocks are understood to play a key role in business cycle fluctuations.
However, quantitative models typically generate opposing responses for consump-
tion and investment with respect to these shocks. This sits in contrast with well-
established observations which show that consumption and investment are both
pro-cyclical over the business cycle. This paper develops a model of firm entry
with business churn and endogenous overhead costs which produces the appropriate
comovement between consumption and investment. Moreover, this paper demon-
strates that CES production technology, with an elasticity of substitution signifi-
cantly below unity, generates the observed comovements between macroeconomic
aggregates on impact and improves model fit in terms of second moments.
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3.1 Introduction
Studies suggest that shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) play
a significant role in business cycle fluctuations. For example, Greenwood, et al
(2000) find that investment shocks explain 30% of the fluctuations in output and
one-quarter of the fluctuations in hours. Moreover, Fisher (2006) determines that
these shocks are responsible for 36-47% of the fluctuations in output and 42-67%
of the fluctuations in hours. Similarly, Justiniano, et al. (2010) find that between
50% and 60% of fluctuations in output and hours can be attributed to investment
shocks. However, in standard quantitative models, a positive (negative) shock to the
marginal efficiency of investment tends to cause consumption to fall (rise) on impact
while investment rises (falls). This conflicts with well-established observations which
show that both consumption and investment move together and are pro-cyclical
over the business cycle. This discrepancy between output and data is known in the
literature as the comovement problem.
The origins of this problem can be traced back to the work of Barro and King
(1984). In a seminal paper, they suggest that any structural model with time-
separable utility and non-TFP shocks (which impact future expectations) will have
difficulty in generating “empirically recognisable business cycles”; namely, the pos-
itive correlations observed between consumption, investment, output and hours in
macroeconomic data. Figure 3.1 exemplifies the comovement problem, the panels
on the left show US data series while the panels on the right represent output from a
‘plain-vanilla’ RBC model with benchmark parameter values chosen from King and
Rebelo (1999). The top left panel displays an upward spike in the relative price of
investment during the Great Recession (denoted by the grey bar). This implies that
investment goods became more expensive during the downturn, which can be inter-
preted as a negative shock to investment. The bottom left panel displays the growth
rates of consumption and investment for the same period. It can be seen that both
of these macroeconomic variables move together in association with output and the
investment shock; growth rates of consumption and investment both fall when there
is an increase in the relative price of investment. In contrast, the top left shows a
negative one percent shock to investment in a benchmark RBC model. From the
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bottom right panel, it can be seen that the model generates opposing responses,
consumption rises on impact while investment falls; in conflict with the observed
data over the business cycle.
Figure 3.1: US Data and Benchmark RBC Output
Evidently, this is an issue of fundamental importance as investment shocks ap-
pear to play a large role in business cycles, yet typical structural models do not
appear to generate the appropriate unconditional comovement between observable
macroeconomic variables. Subsequently, this may call into question the validity of
our understanding of investment shock transmission mechanisms which are derived
from standard RBC models. This paper demonstrates that the inclusion of business
churn and endogenous overhead costs in a model of firm entry is capable of resolv-
ing the comovement problem and improves model fit in terms of second moments.
The model developed here naturally adds to the existing literature of firm dynamics
pioneered by Bilbiie, et al (2012) (henceforth, BGM) through the addition of invest-
ment adjustment costs in the style of Christiano, et al (2005) and business churn
with endogenous overhead costs.
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the comovement problem
can be resolved by emphasising the important role of firm dynamics in the econ-
omy. To date, most papers in this literature place emphasis on the consumer side
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and adopt a relatively standard approach to the firm side. Moreover, this paper
demonstrates that lowering the elasticity of substitution enables positive comove-
ment between consumption and investment on impact; in keeping with a range of
empirical estimation which suggests σ is well below unity (see Klump, et al (2011)
for a comprehensive review).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 consists of a literature
review. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 generalises the production technology
and overviews the utilisation of ‘normalised’ CES functions. Section 5 examines the
impulse response functions under different elasticities of substitution and matches
moments of the model to US data. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Lastly,
the appendix simplifies the comovement problem to that of wedges and derives
analytical expressions and proofs for when positive comovement is achieved.
3.2 Literature Review
It is well-known that consumption tends to moves counter-cyclically in structural
models with time-separable utility (no restriction on intertemporal substitution)
when there are positive shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment (Barro and
King, 1984). A straightforward interpretation is that when investment in new capital
goods is relatively cheaper, it becomes optimal to sacrifice some present consumption
(and postpone leisure) in order to invest and obtain a higher level of output (and
consumption) in the future. In other words, a fall in the relative price of investment
goods induces intertemporal substitution which usually dominates over intratemporal
substitution on impact. As a result, the immediate increase in investment and hours
worked (and output) is such that consumption initially falls on impact and moves
in the ‘wrong’ direction.
However, Greenwood, et al. (1988) show that it is possible to achieve positive
comovement in a basic structural model. Two key aspects enable their result;
non-separable utility and capacity utilisation costs. Firstly, GHH preferences are
adopted, which exhibit non-separability in consumption and leisure (labour supply
depends on the wage rate but not consumption; there is no wealth effect). This shuts
56
3.2 Literature Review
down the intertemporal substitution channel which usually causes consumption to
fall on impact. Secondly, utilisation costs allow the capital stock to be worked with
greater intensity at the expense of accelerated depreciation. This makes it possible
for capital input to rise immediately without an increase in physical investment.
As a result, the existing capital stock is worked with greater intensity on impact,
mitigating the effect of diminishing returns to labour and increasing output in re-
sponse to the shock. This induces an outward shift in labour demand, which causes
the wage rate and hours worked to increase. Subsequently, as there is no wealth
effect, output rises along with consumption and investment. The primary disadvan-
tage to this approach is that there is little empirical evidence (or a priori reasoning)
which suggests that non-separability of consumption and leisure is a reasonable func-
tional form to assume. The restrictive nature of GHH preferences has subsequently
motivated studies which propose alternative ways of reconciling the comovement
problem.
For example, in a medium-scale DSGE model, Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) demon-
strate that comovement can be achieved with separable utility. Capacity utilisation
with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities are used to generate positive
comovement. Nominal rigidities induce counter-cyclical wage and price mark-ups
which result in an outward shift in labour demand in response to a positive in-
vestment shock. This leads to an amplified response in hours worked which causes
output and consumption to rise on impact. Under this framework they emphasise
that both GHH preferences and monopolistic competition with nominal rigidities are
separately capable of generating this result; however, when estimating the model,
the data clearly favours the latter explanation. The emphasis on the nominal rigidi-
ties channel over the weak intertemporal substitution channel also yields a superior
fit for US data in terms of the second moments of consumption, output, and hours.
Furlanetto, et al (2013) propose a resolution to the comovement problem using rule-
of-thumb consumers and nominal rigidities. In their setup, a portion of agents con-
sists of rule-of-thumb consumers who do not engage in financial markets in order to
smooth consumption; instead, each period they simply consume their entire income
(they have a zero wealth effect). In response to a shock to the marginal efficiency of
investment, it becomes optimal for agents to increase their hours worked and post-
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pone leisure. Naturally, this leads to an increase in consumption for rule-of-thumb
consumers since they do not invest. If the portion of rule-of-thumb consumers is
sufficiently large (greater than approximately 25% of agents, given their specified
parameter calibration), aggregate consumption rises on impact and comovement is
achieved. Nominal rigidities helps reinforce positive comovement by dampening the
intertemporal substitution effect; this enables the result to be achieved for a larger
subset of the parameter space.
In a benchmark New Keynesian DSGE model with endogenous capital accumu-
lation, Furlanetto and Seneca (2014) find that sufficient substitutability between
leisure and consumption, along with nominal rigidities are key to resolving the co-
movement problem. They emphasise that GHH preferences generate comovement
primarily due to the strong complementarity induced by non-separability between
leisure and consumption. Using a generalised additively-separable utility function,
they demonstrate that the size of the wealth effect is largely unimportant for gen-
erating the appropriate comovement of macroeconomic variables. Instead, the size
of intertemporal substitution determines the magnitude of the response, while the
degree of complementarity between hours and consumption determines the sign of
comovement on impact.
Eusepi and Preston (2015) construct a model with heterogeneity in consumption
and labour. They establish that positive comovement hinges on the consumption
differential between employed and non-employed agents, and their relative labour
inputs. In this framework, each household consists of a continuum of agents, and
labour market participation entails a fixed cost. Households determine which mem-
bers work and the duration of their work. A shock to the marginal efficiency of
investment causes an increase in the intensive margin of employed agents through
the usual mechanism. However, it also causes an increase in the extensive margin
(share of total agents in employment) as it becomes worthwhile for non-employed
agents to pay the fixed cost and enter into market production. Compositional effects
arising from the increase in the employment rate leads to a substantial increase in
aggregate consumption which generates positive comovement.
Ascari, et al (2016) employ a medium-scale New Keynesian model with the addition
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of intermediate goods in the production function to resolve the comvement problem
and (what they refer to as) the “Barro-King Curse”. Their ‘roundabout production’
approach creates an amplification mechanism whereby an increase in output raises
the use of intermediate inputs and further boosts output. This enables the possibility
of positive correlation between consumption and investment with respect to MEI
shocks. Furthermore, they demonstrate that TFP shocks do not always generate the
expected unconditional positive correlation between output and hours, as implied
by Barro and King (1984). This is due to substantial intratemporal substitution
combined with the aforemention amplification mehcanism which causes a fall in
hours on impact of a TFP shock.
Chen and Liao (2018) address the comovement problem utilising sticky-prices in a
two-sector model with consumer durables. An investment shock increases the de-
mand for new capital goods and raises the price of consumer durables relative to non-
durables. The intra-temporal substitution away from durable consumption towards
non-durable consumption dominates the intertemporal substitution effect whereby
current non-durable consumption is reduced in order to fund new investments. As
a result, nondurable consumption rises and positive comovement is achieved. How-
ever, whether intra-temporal substitutions dominates over intertemporal substitu-
tion is primarily governed by the elasticity of substitution between durables and
non-durables. Sufficient complementarity is required to achieve the desired result
- an elasticity of substitution just a little below unity, with benchmark parameter
values, does not generate the appropriate comovement between consumption and
investment.
3.3 Model
The infinitely lived representative agent exhibits KPR preferences and derives utility
from consumption (consisting of a basket of differentiated goods) and disutility from
work each period. Where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, σc > 0 is the
constant relative risk aversion, 1/ϕ = η > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity and χ > 0
is a scaling constant pinned down by other parameters.
59










In any given period the consumer enjoys a collection of goods which are aggregated
into a single basket of consumption goods Ct. There exists a continuum of mo-
nopolistic firms which each produce their own variety ω where θ is the elasticity of









Following the standard framework of BGM (2012) firms are atomistic and therefore
the mark-up µ is independent of the number of firms (varieties produced) n. The
mark-up is purely a function of the elasticity of substitution θ between the different
varieties of goods µ = θ/ (θ − 1) (the substituability between goods is fixed and
does not change with the number of varieties available). The representative agent
maximises lifetime utility subject to the following three constraints below, where first
order conditions are taken with respect to consumption Ct, labour Lt, investment
It, capital Kt+1, entry Et+1, and firms Nt+1:
L = ∑∞t=0 βt {C1−σct1−σc − χL1+ηt1+η
}
−λt [Ct + It + Et − wtLt − rtKt − pitNt]
−κt
[






















The representative agent simultaneously chooses investment and capital stock due
to the presence of the investment adjustment cost in the style of Christiano, et al
(2005) - the same applies for entry and firms. Where κ > 0 represents the adjustment
cost for investment and ψ > 0 represents the adjustment cost for firm entry; this
is referred to as ‘business churn’ (Aloi et al, 2019). Respectively, δK ∈ (0, 1) and
δN ∈ (0, 1) represent the rate of capital depreciation and the rate of firm exit.
Additionally, κt is the shadow value of an additional unit of physical capital and
Ωt is the shadow value of one more firm entering the market. Unlike BGM (2012)
there is only one sector, and therefore no relative price, new firms are created out
of total income, as opposed to only labour inputs. The first order conditions of the





= C−σct − λt = 0 (3.1)
∂L
∂Lt
= −χLηt − λtwt = 0 (3.2)
∂L
∂Kt+1
= βλt+1rt+1 − κt + βκt+1 (1− δK) = 0 (3.3)
∂L
∂Nt+1
= βλt+1pit+1 −Ωt + βΩt+1 (1− δN) = 0 (3.4)
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Consolidating equations (3.1) and (3.2) yields the standard labour-leisure optimality
condition of the household. Furthermore, combining equations (3.1) and (3.2) gives
the Euler equation for capital, while combining equations (3.1) and (3.3) gives the
Euler equation for firms (entry arbitrage condition). Manipulating (3.5) and (3.6)
by dividing through λt gives the marginal Tobin’s Q for capital Qt = κt/λtand
the marginal Tobin’s U for firms Ut = Ωt/λt respectively (full model equations are
detailed in Table 3.1 below). These conditions ensure optimal decision from the
household.
The aggregate production technology is a normalised CES function with composite
capital Zt and labour Lt. The composite capital consists of physical capital stock















Zt = Kνt N1−νt (3.8)
Where, σ ∈ (0,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between composite capital and
labour and where the implicit elasticity of substitution between firms and physical
capital is fixed at unity and α0 ∈ (0, 1) represents the composite capital intensity in
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production; this also corresponds to the baseline (steady state) total capital income
share.
Firms face an overhead cost φt which is paid every period and represents a fraction
of their output. The overhead cost varies across the business cycle in a similar
specification to a utilisation cost φt = φ0Uγt . This can be thought of broadly as
the costs associated with operating inputs, such as the rent of the building or office
and maintenance supplies. The interpretation is that when the marginal value of an
existing firm is greater than the marginal value of creating a new firm Ut > 1 the
overhead cost faced by a firm rises due to the anticipated reallocation of resources
towards firm creation; positive net entry shifts firms demand for operating inputs
outwards and pushes up overhead costs.
Furthermore, additional objects denoted with zero subscripts, such as Y0, Z0, L0
and, φ0 represent baseline (steady state) values for endogenous variables. These
provide the natural benchmark around which the CES function is normalised. As
part of the motivation of this paper is to examine the comovement problem under a
generalised CES production technology, the effect of the elasticity of substitution on
business cycle fluctuations and steady state allocations must be invariant to σ. The
production function must be expressed in its ‘normalised’ or ‘reparameterised’ form
where inputs and output are effectively treated as indexes - this isolates the impact
of changes in σ on the business cycle and puts long run growth balanced growth
dynamics to one side in favour of a deeper understanding of short run fluctuations.
Each individual firm maximises its profits by choosing physical capital and labour,
subject to the constraints. The decision to invest in firm creation is chosen by the
agent, hence first order conditions are taken with respect to capital and labour only.
Substituting (3.8) into (3.7) and diving through by Nt, where lower case letters
denote per-firm variables zt = kνt , yields the firm-level production function. This



















































σ − wt = 0 (3.10)
Due to the differentiated goods the constant markup µ appears as a fixed wedge
in the first order conditions for capital and labour in (3.9) and (3.10); as such
each factor is not remunerated exactly at its marginal product due the presence of
some monopoly power. The model is then closed with the autoregressive process
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is persistence of the shock, where εt ∼ (0, σε) is the zero mean
shock process and Xt is the relative price of investment goods (marginal efficiency
of investment) ln (Xt) = ρ ln (Xt−1) + εt (for now the simplifying assumption is
made to have only stochastic shocks, not permanent shocks, in order to better
understand the relationship between the comovement problem and the elasticity of
substitution). The equilibrium equations for the model consist of the first order
conditions (3.1) through (3.10) plus the additional constraints from the household
optimisation problem. These conditions are detailed as follows in Table 3.1 below.
To give an overview of the normalisation procedure, Figure 3.2 below shows a plot of
two production functions (and corresponding isoquants projected onto the xy-plane)
which differ only in their elasticity of substitution (the red surface represents σ = 1.5
and the blue surface represents σ = 0). As can be seen, there is single ray (denoted
by a dashed line) along which the two production surfaces are tangent (this can
also be seen in two-dimensional space; each pair of red and blue isoquants are only
tangent at a single point). At the point of tangency, the value of the elasticity of
substitution will not affect the level of output. However, deviating from this point
(steady state), it can clearly be seen that output will be affected when σ varies.
Normalisation requires that steady state allocations be expressed in terms of ex-
ogenous parameters which do not feature σ (endogenous variables in the steady
state must not be affected by the elasticity of substitution). Following the ap-
proach of Cantore, et al (2014), output, labour (and firm overhead costs here) are
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium Conditions
Model Equations
Labour Supply χLηtCσct = wt
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Firm Overhead Costs φt = φ0Uγt















Composite Capital Zt = Kνt N1−νt
Income Identity Yt = Ct + It + Et


















Autoregressive Process ln (Xt) = ρ ln (Xt−1) + εt
normalised to unity. Normalising allows all endogenous variables to be identified
independently of the elasticity of substitution. This ensures that steady state al-
locations will remain on a point of tangency between ‘families’ of CES production
functions (transitory dynamics are altered by the elasticity of substitution, but not
steady states).
Note that neither σ or η appear in any of the steady state expressions when the
equilibrium equations are reduced and solved. This ensures that only transitory
dynamics are effected by these two parameters; as a result, the effect these two key
parameter have on business cycle moments can be evaluated directly and in isolation
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Figure 3.2: σ = 0 and σ = 1.5 production surfaces
because they have no impact on equilibrium allocations. Dropping time subscripts
to denote equilibrium, the remaining steady states are obtained by consolidating
and rearranging the equilibrium equations. The steady states are shown in Table
3.2.
3.4 Simulations and Results
In order to simulate the model, parameters must be chosen. The first nine param-
eters values in Table 2.3 are taken directly from the BGM (2012), the next four
are adjustment costs which are chosen conservatively to bias against achieving pos-
itive comovement. Finally, the elasticity of factor substitution is varied in line with
empirical estimates in the literature (Chirinko, 2008). It is worth noting that α0
corresponds to the total capital share of income at all times if the production tech-
nology is Cobb-Douglas. However, when the elasticity of substitution is not equal
to unity this parameter corresponds to the total capital income share only in the
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Table 3.2: Normalised Steady State Values
Steady States
Relative Price X = 1
Labour L = 1
Tobin’s Q Q = 1
Tobin’s U U = 1
Overhead Cost φ = 1
Output Y = 1
Rental Rate r = 1
β
− 1 + δK
Capital Stock K = α0ν
µr
Firm Profit pi = 1
β
− 1 + δN
Wage Rate w = 1−α0
µ
Investment I = δKK
Firms N = Y−wL−rK
pi
Entry E = δEN
Consumption C = Y − I − E
Composite Capital Z = KνN1−ν
steady state; during transitory dynamics α0 will differ from the capital income share
when σ 6= 1. Therefore, to ensure consistency across different production technolo-
gies, α0 is referred to as the baseline capital income share, since at the steady state,
for all values of σ this holds true. All other parameters retain their standard inter-
pretations. The list of parameters and their assigned values are displayed in table
3.3.
Table 3.3: Parameter Values
Parameter Values
α0 Baseline Capital Share 0.33
β Subjective Discount Factor 0.99
δK Capital Depreciation Rate 0.025
δN Firm Exit Rate 0.025
σc Relative Risk Aversion 1
η Inverse Frisch Elasticity 0.25
θ Goods Elasticitiy of Substitution 3.8
φ0 Baseline Firm Overhead Costs 1
ρ Autoregressive Coefficent 0.95
ν Capital-Composite Elasticity 0.33
κ Capital Adjustment Cost 1
ψ Firm Entry Adjustment Cost 1
γ Overhead Costs Elasticity 0.5
σ Elasticity of Factor Substitution 0.4− 0.8
The vast majority of the parameters values chosen in BGM (2012) are standard in the
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literature - many are derived from King and Rebelo (1999). The value of ν has been
assigned to one third, this represents the physical-to-composite capital elasticity and
chosen in line with the composite-capital output elasticity. The costs for capital
adjustment and firm entry business churn are both assigned to unity; these are fair
and reasonable estimates which do not impose excessively large costs to adjustment.
Overhead firm costs dynamics function similarly to a capacity utilisation cost à la
Greenwood, et al (1988) where γ is the overhead costs elasticity. This elasticity
is assigned a value of one-half in order to introduce concavity into the function (as
opposed to convexity, as in Greenwood, et al (1998), where working the capital stock
with greater intensity has a more than proportional impact on accelerating capital
depreciation). The intuition behind this concavity 1 > γ is that a marginal unit
of output being reallocated to net firm creation will have a less than proportional
impact on period overhead costs which firms pay for operational inputs; again, this
lower value biases against positive comovement as it dampens the amplification
mechanism which enables slack in the resource constraint such that consumption
can rise on impact alongside investment.
Impulse Response Functions: Below displays the impulse response functions
for a positive shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (with various values
of σ). Firstly, it can be seen that consumption rises on impact and exhibits a
positive comovement with investment, output and hours when there is sufficient
gross complementarity (an elasticity in the region of σ = 0.4 and below).1 When σ
is low, a fall in the relative price of investment goods no longer causes consumption
to decrease on impact; instead, it rises modestly. However, this is not due to a weak
wealth effect caused by impeding the intertemporal substitution channel. Instead,
it is caused by a substantial intra-temporal reallocation of resource away from net
firm creation and an outward shift in labour demand. These two channels both play
a key role in generating an “empirically recognisable business cycle” in regards to
appropriate unconditional comovements of macroeconomic variables.
Firstly, due to the nested production technology containing two types of capital (the
MEI shock applies only to physical capital), resource flow away from firm creation
1The comovement problem persists for higher values of σ, as the parameters such as relative risk
aversion, adjustment costs, and overhead cost elasticity being chosen conservatively to bias
against generating positive comovement between consumption and investment.
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on impact as investment in physical capital becomes relatively cheaper. When firm
entry falls Et ↓ additional slack is immediately created in the resource constraint
Yt = Ct ↑ +It ↑ +Et ↓ which allows either investment or consumption to rise. Sec-
ondly, firms marginal Tobin’s U decreases on impact; this represents an anticipated
reallocation of resources away from net firm entry Uss+1 < 12. Subsequently, firms
demand for operating inputs shifts inwards and overhead costs fall. The extent to
which firm creation is curbed affects the extent to which overhead costs fall. This
has the indirect effect of raising demand for factor inputs at the firm-level, enduing
a rise in hours worked and output on impact and thus enabling consumption to
increase alongside investment.
2Subscript t = ss+ 1 represent the period the shock hits; a perturbation from the steady state.
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Matching Second Moments: Naturally, the next step is to take the model to the
data to ensure the relative volatility of key macroeconomic variables are matched.
The model is simulated in line with the above parameter values specified in Table 3.3
and is compared with macroeconomic data series taken from the FRED database for
the US. These series are log transformed and de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter. The standard deviations are then matched with the following variables dis-
played in Table 3.4. The model is compared with three different elasticities of
substitution, which are shown in the impulse response functions in Figure 3.3.
From Table 3.4 below it can be seen that, generally speaking, lower eleasiticties of
substitution better match the relative volatilities of macroeconomic variables; and
are in keeping with the empirical estimates of σ in the literature. Additionally, they
preserve positive comovement between consumption, investment, hours and output;
which is also observed in the data.
Table 3.4: Second Moments
Variable Data σ = 0.8 σ = 0.6 σ = 0.4
Standard Deviation (%)
Output 1.49 0.85 0.87 0.89
Relative Standard Deviation
Consumption 0.59 0.50 0.56 0.62
Investment 3.14 0.80 0.76 0.71
Hours 1.27 0.54 0.56 0.60
Wages 0.61 0.41 0.48 0.59
Rental Rate 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.20
Labour Share 0.48 0.08 0.19 0.38
The second moments generated by the model for output under different elasticity
specifications shown in Table 3.4 are broadly in line with the literature. For example,
Justiniano, et al. (2010), claims that 50% to 60% of fluctuations in output and hours
can be accounted for by investment shocks. A similar result is found here, between
57% and 60% of the volatility in output, and 43% to 47% in the volatility of hours,
can be accounted for by the investment shock. Broadly speaking, the model does well
in capturing the relative volailities of consumption, wages, rental rate and the labour
share. On the whole, the specification of σ = 0.4 does the best job of simultaneously
matching consumption, wages, rental rate and the labour share. This is consistent
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with Cantore, et al (2015) who claim that much lower elasticities of substitution are
superior to Cobb-Douglas type specifications when analysing business cycles; in the
short-run there is relatively limited substitutability between factors and a low value
of σ generates the observed persistence in macroeconomic variables.
However, the model performs more poorly, for in accounting for the fluctuations in
investment observed in the data.3 This due to the fact that adjustment costs and
firm entry reduce the overall variance of investment in model simulations. Lowering
the adjustment costs and the relative risk aversion helps boost the relative volatility
of investment such that it is greater than output; however this does not preserve
the appropriate comovement between consumption and investment on impact of
the MEI shock. Nevertheless, the model derived here remains a tractable flexible
price model which matches the appropriate comovement between macroeconomic
variables for a significant and plausible subset of the parameter space.
3.5 Conclusion
Investment shocks are understood to play a key role in business cycles. However,
in typical models, in response to a positive investment shock, consumption tends
to fall on impact while investment rises. This contrasts with empirical observa-
tions, which show that consumption and investment are both pro-cyclical over the
business cycle. This paper demonstrates that the appropriate comovement between
consumption and investment can be achieved in a simple flexible price RBC frame-
work via the inclusion of firm entry with business churn and endogenous overhead
costs. Therefore, this paper contributes to both the current firm dynamics liter-
ature as well as the recent literature on the comovement problem. Typically, the
comovement problem has been dealt with by variety of approaches in structural
models, usually with some combination of nominal and real frictions, typically from
the consumer side of the problem. This paper instead resolves this problem from
the firm side through a focus on entry dynamics and generalised CES production
technology.
3Investment in Table 2.4 here refers to the investment in physical capital stock only, it does not
include firm creation.
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Analysing firm dynamics with a CES production function, it is found that the elas-
ticity of factor substitution determines the magnitude and sign of consumption on
impact in response to the investment shock. An elasticity of factor substitution well
below unity (in line with empirical estimates) is required to generate the appropri-
ate comovements. Furthermore, it is found that a lower elasticity of substitution
appears to better match data in terms of second moments for the US economy: as
is consistent with other studies in the literature.
This paper also provides an additional appendix which demonstrates that investment
shocks can generate positive comovement between consumption and investment on
impact in a standard flexible-price RBC framework through the inclusion of only a
simple time-varying labour wedge. The wedge introduces a rudimentary propagation
mechanism by which the volatility of the labour supply decision is amplified in
response to shocks. This simple model derived in this appendix allows for tractable
analytical expressions which describe when positive comovement is achieved and can




This appendix demonstrates that investment shocks can generate positive comove-
ment between consumption and investment on impact in a standard flexible-price
RBC framework through the inclusion of a simple time-varying labour wedge. The
wedge introduces a rudimentary propagation mechanism by which the volatility of
the labour supply decision is amplified in response to shocks; this subsequently in-
creases the response of output on impact and provides sufficient slack in the resource
constraint such that both consumption and investment can rise together. The model
derived in this appendix allows for tractable analytical expressions which describe
when positive comovement is achieved. With standard KPR preferences, it is shown
that the Frisch elasticity, along with the relative size of the labour wedge, play a
key role in determining the magnitude and sign of consumption on impact in re-
sponse to an investment shock. Reducing the comovement problem (or “Barro-King
Curse”) down to a simple time-varying labour wedge enables straightforward and
clear insights to be made regarding the transmission mechanisms which enable this
result.4
The infinitely lived representative agent exhibits period utility of the following form










The utility function is strictly concave and continuous. Where β ∈ (0, 1) is the
subjective discount factor, η > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity and χ > 0 is a
scaling constant which ensures that steady state labour is equal to unity. Capital
stock is now written as Kt−1 to emphasise that it is a state variable and δ ∈ (0, 1)
represent the rate of capital depreciation. The agent maximises discounted lifetime
utility subject to the capital law of motion, the budget constraint and the time-
varying labour wedge (where Φ = Φt = Φt−1 represents a fixed exogenous sequence
4This simple amplification mechanism captures two key observable features of the US labour mar-
ket. Firstly, estimates of the labour-wedge exhibit significant counter-cyclicality (Atesagaoglu
and Elgin, 2014; Zhang, 2018) Secondly, the amplification in the labour supply decision gener-
ated by the counter-cyclical wedge generates an improvement of fit in terms of second moments
for US hours worked data.
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and τt is the time-varying wedge):
wtLt + rtKt−1 = Ct + It + Φ (3.11)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + ItXt (3.12)
Φ = wtLtτt (3.13)
Substituting (3.12) and (3.13) into (3.11) yields the constraint for the consumer’s
problem. The labour-leisure condition and the consumption-Euler equation are de-
rived from the maximisation problem:









Additionally, w˜t is written to represent the effective-wage rate (analogous to a post-
tax wage rate):
w˜t = wt (1− τt) (3.16)
The labour wedge τt fluctuates optimally over the business cycle in order to meet
the exogenous sequence Φ (equivalent to an endogenous labour tax). The following
auxiliary maximisation problem is required to ensure optimal consumer decisions
with respect to the time-varying wedge. Manipulating equations (3.11) through
(3.16) provides the constraints for the auxiliary welfare maximisation problem:
L =∑∞t=0 βt [lnCt − χL1+ηt1+η
]
+λ1t [wtLt − w˜tLt − Φ]
+λ2t
[





First order conditions are taken with respect to consumption, leisure and the effective-







− λ2t + λ3tχLηt = 0 (3.17)
∂L
∂Lt
= Lηt + λ1t (wt − w˜t) + λ2t w˜t + λ3tχηLη−1t Ct = 0 (3.18)
∂L
∂w˜t
= −λ1tLt + λ2tLt − λ3t = 0 (3.19)
Furthermore, the representative firm faces Cobb-Douglas production technology and
operates in a perfectly competitive market.
Yt = Kαt−1L1−αt (3.20)






wt = (1− α) Yt
Lt
(3.22)
The model is closed with the autoregressive process where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is persistence
of the shock, and where εt ∼ (0, σε) is the zero mean shock process and Xt is the
relative price of investment goods:
ln (Xt) = ρ ln (Xt−1) + εt (3.23)
Equations (3.11) through (3.23) represent the equilibrium conditions for the decen-
tralised economy (shown in the Table 3.5 below):
Steady state allocations be expressed in terms of exogenous parameters. Replacing
time subscripts with ss to denote equilibrium, the remaining steady states are ob-
tained accordingly by rearranging and consolidating the equations from the Table
3.5. Due to the production technology being Cobb-Douglas there is no variation in
the elasticity of substitution (as shown earlier), therefore output does not need to be
normalised to unity. The steady states in Table 3.6 are used for deriving analytical
expressions to create boundary conditions which show the parameter subspace for
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Table 3.5: Equilibrium Conditions
Model Equations
Labour Supply χLηtCt = wt (1− τt)
Capital Supply Ct+1Ct = β
(
Xtrt+1 + (1− δ) XtXt+1
)
Labour Demand wt = (1− α) YtLt
Capital Demand rt = α YtKt−1
Production Function Yt = Kαt−1L1−αt
Accounting Identity Yt = Ct + It + Φ
Law of Motion Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + ItXt
Net-Wage Rate wt (1− τt) = w˜t
Exogenous Distortion Φ = wtLtτt
Consumption Optimality 1Ct − λ2t + λ3tχL
η
t = 0
Labour Optimality −χLηt + λ1t (wt − w˜t) + λ2t w˜t + λ3tχηLη−1t Ct = 0
Net-Wage Optimality −λ1tLt + λ2tLt − λ3t = 0
Autoregressive Process lnXt = ρ lnXt−1 + εt
which positive comovement is generated on impact. Recall, the scaling constant
ensures that labour is normalised to unity in the steady state; this feature becomes
key in deriving analytical boundary exclusively in terms of parameters as labour is
equal to one in the immediate neighborhood of the steady state.
Table 3.6: Steady State Expressions
Steady States
Price of Investment Xss = 1
Labour Lss = 1
Rental Rate rss = 1−β+βδβ






























































Model simulations imply that for a subset of the parameter space (low inverse frisch
elasticity or high exogenous distortion) consumption rises on impact and exhibits
a positive comovement with investment, hours and output. A fall in the relative
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price of investment does not causes consumption to decrease on impact; instead, it
rises modestly. In response to an investment shock, an additional increase in hours
worked is induced by a rise in the effective-wage rate as a result of a reduction in
the labour wedge (on top of intra-temporal substitution away from leisure towards
labour). This is because the value of the exogenous sequence remains unchanged
in absolute terms. Therefore, when output rises, the labour wedge (labour tax)
falls to ensure the constraint Φ = wtLtτt is satisfied in each period. The labour
response on impact is key to achieving positive comovement between consumption
and investment; the inverse Frisch elasticity is of crucial importance.
The intuition behind the main result of this appendix can be summarised as follows.
Shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment appear only in the capital law of
motion. Capital is a state variable; therefore, it is fixed in the current period. Sub-
sequently, investment shocks are not capable of impacting the existing capital stock
in the same period (unlike Hicks-neutral productivity shocks which enter directly
into the production function). As a result, it is only possible to increase output in
the period of the investment shock by increasing labour input. From the accounting
identity (Yt = Ct+It+Φ) it can be seen that it is a necessary condition for output to
rise if both consumption and investment are to increase contemporaneously with the
shock (i.e. generate positive comovement between labour, output, consumption and
investment). Therefore, the immediate increase in labour input must be sufficient to
provide the necessary slack in the resource constraint such that both consumption
and investment can rise together.
Numerical and analytical expressions are derived which demonstrate when this is
achieved with respect to a positive investment shock. Starting from the steady state
(t = ss) assume there is a small perturbation from equilibrium (t = ss + 1), the










Once the first two conditions are proved (consumption and labour), the second two
follow trivially. The conditions will be dealt with in the aforementioned order, start-
ing with consumption. Manipulating the static labour-leisure optimality condition,
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it can be shown that an explicit relationship exists between current consumption
and current labour input
χLηtCt = wt (1− τt)
χLη+1t Ct = wtLt − Φ
χLη+1t Ct = (1− α)Kαt−1L1−αt − Φ
Ct =
(1− α)Kαt−1L1−αt − Φ
χLη+1t
Evaluate this equation assuming some small perturbation from the steady state
(t = ss+ 1):
Css+1 =
(1− α)KαssL1−αss+1 − Φ
χLη+1ss+1
Since capital is a state variable it is fixed in the period the shock hits, Kss can be







1−α L1−αss+1 − Φ
χLη+1ss+1
This yields a one-to-one mapping of consumption to labour in the period of the
shock hits. Taking the first derivative of this univariated function and evaluating
the sign informs us as to whether consumption is increasing or decreasing (with
respect to its steady state) when there is a small change in labour input from its
steady state value of unity.5
dCss+1
dLss+1









+ (η + 1)Φ
χLη+2ss+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
LWE
It can directly be seen that if the exogenous distortionary sequence Φ is set to zero
(the model nests a ‘plain-vanilla’ RBC with no labour wedge) that consumption will
be always fall on impact, with respect to a small change in labour input. Whether
5Naturally, this expression only holds in the period of the shock, for t > ss+ 1 onward the state
variable is no longer fixed at its equilibrium value.
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consumption increases on impact depends on if the intertemporal substitution effect
(ISE) or the labour wedge effect (LWE) dominates. Intertemporal substitution is
induced by the shock, consumption is reduced in order to invest more today and
to increase future income. However, the rise in output on impact also reduces
the labour wedge distortion, as a result, hours worked increase such that there is
additional slack in the resource constraint so that consumption can rise.
Since labour is normalised to unity in the steady state through the scaling constant
χ, evaluating the derivative in the immediate neighborhood of the steady state gives:
dCss+1
dLss+1




1− β + βδ
) α
1−α
+ (η + 1)Φ
χ
> 0
Rearrange the inequality to make Φ the subject:
Φ >








The exogenous sequence must be greater than the above expression for consumption
to be positive on impact (when labour is increasing on impact with respect to the
shock). Additionally, to ensure a steady state exists, Φ must also not be too large










1− β + βδ
) 1
1−α
Applying benchmark values of α = 0.35, β = 0.96, η = 1 Figure 3.3 displays the δ-Φ
subset of the parameter space. This diagram below shows for which parameter values
consumption moves positively with respect to a small change in labour input from
the steady state (the grey shaded area is where the labour wedge effect dominates the
intertemporal substitution effect). As can be seen, if the exogenous sequence is too
small, the labour wedge amplification mechanism is too small, and the intertemporal
substitution effect dominates the labour wedge effect; consumption falls with respect
to a small increase in labour input (the blue shaded area in figure 4). The white
area represent the combinations of δ-Φ where no feasible steady state exists (in this
region steady state consumption would have to be negative).
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Figure 3.3: Consumption-Leisure static δ-Φ parameter space
Therefore, it follows that if Φ lies between the following boundaries, consumption
will be increasing in labour:




















However, the main objective is to show that consumption is increasing with respect
to the investment shock on impact. Therefore, it must be shown that dLss+1
dXss+1
> 0
also holds, then as a corollary, it proves dCss+1
dXss+1
> 0 since it has already be shown
that dCss+1
dLss+1
> 0 is achieved from (3.26).
Given that there is some optimal transition path back to the steady state after an
investment shock (and the static consumption-labour relationship has already been
utilised) a numerical simulation must provide boundary conditions for when positive
intra-temporal substitution towards labour is achieved (shown in Figure 3.4 below).
Investment shocks generally induces intra-temporal substitution towards labour;
when investment goods become less costly, leisure is postponed in order to increase
income and invest more. Therefore, to show dLss+1
dXss+1
> 0, we simply need δ not
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to be too large (given reasonable parameter values of α, β, and η). When δ be-
comes too large it thwarts the intra-temporal substitution channel towards labour
as the marginal gain from investment is strictly decreasing with respect to capital
depreciation.
Figure 3.4: Labour-Investment Shock static δ-Φ parameter space
There is no neat analytical expression for this threshold, so a numerical simulation
is generated to approximate the boundary condition:
Φ < f (α, β, δ, η)
Additionally, Φmust be sufficiently small such that it does not induce intra-temporal
substitution towards leisure and cause labour to move in the ‘wrong’direction on
impact of the investment shock. If the exogenous distortion is too large then the
labour wedge in the steady state will be large (as shown in Table 3.5). The larger
the wedge τss the larger the marginal utility of leisure in the neighbourhood of the
steady state becomes. This may be such that for an extreme subset of the parameter
space a positive investment shock induces a reduction in hours worked.
Examining Figure 3.4 and contrasting it with Figure 3.3, it can be seen that the nu-
merical threshold Φ < f (α, β, δ, η) is strictly below the feasibility constraint thresh-
81











1−α . As this appendix is interested in generating
positive comovement on impact such that (3.24) is satisfied; the latter condition
becomes superfluous. Laying figure 3.3 and figure 3.4 on top of each other to create
a composite image illustrates this argument clearly. Figure 3.5 shows that when
the two diagrams are overlaid, there emerges an overlap in the thresholds. In this
region of the parameter subspace (the shaded dark red area) positive comovement
dCss+1
dXss+1
> 0 and dLss+1
dXss+1
> 0 is achieved.
Figure 3.5: Composite of Figure 4 and 5
This composite diagram also shows that, for benchmark values of the discount factor
and the labour share, capital depreciation must not exceed approximately 0.26;
the point where the two boundaries intersect. Therefore, if δ ? 0.26, there is no
corresponding value for Φ which will generate the amplification in hours worked (as
the intra-temporal substitution channel is weakened) such that all cross-correlations
on impact in (3.24) are satisfied.
Now it has been shown for what parameter values positive consumption and labour
responses are achieved with respect to the shock, it must be shown for the remaining
two conditions of output and investment.
Proving dYss+1
dXss+1
> 0 follows trivially from dYss+1
dLss+1





> 0 (as shown). Since capital stock is fixed in the period of
the shock, only labour can influence output when the investment shock hits. Addi-
tionally, from the Inada condition under Cobb-Douglas we know that the marginal









Steady state capital is substituted into the production function. Differentiating
with respect to labour gives the marginal product of labour on impact of the shock;













> 0 and implies dYss+1
dXss+1
> 0. Finally, it must be shown that
investment also increases with respect to the shock. This also follows trivially:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + ItXt
Investment︷ ︸︸ ︷
Kss+1 − (1− δ)
(
βα




It can be observed that on the left hand side of the above equation is investment.
Directly it can be seen that dIss+1
dXss+1
> 0. (Unsurprisingly) investment rises on impact
relative to its steady state when there is a positive investment shock (capital stock
in the next period must rise).
Therefore, it can be concluded that to satisfy all conditions in (24) that Φ must lie
between the following threshold (3.27). Given typical values for α, β and η this is
achieved provided that δ is not too large.
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1− β + βδ
) α
1−α
< Φ < f (α, β, δ, η) (3.27)
While the inverse Frisch elasticity is set to unity to give logarithmic utility in leisure,
allowing η to vary also yields important results. Since the labour response on impact
of the shock is the key to resolving the comovement problem in this framework, η
plays a very important role. The lower the inverse Frisch elasticity, the stronger the
labour response and thus the easier it is to generate the slack needed in the resource
constraint for consumption to rise alongside investment in the period of the shock.
Figure 3.6 below shows the thresholds generated when the inverse Frisch elasticity

















With further manipulation, it can be seen that β and δ only enter into the above






stituting in and rearranging gives a simple and elegant expression where the inverse
frisch elasticity is a function of only the capital share α and the exogenous sequence-
output ratio Φ/Yss
η <





This states that the inverse frisch elasticity must be below a given threshold to satisfy
the conditions in (3.24). The larger the relative distortion to output, the higher the
marginal utility of leisure is in the steady state. Therefore, the larger Φ/Yss, the
larger the reduction in the relative size of the labour wedge τss+1/Yss+1and the
larger the amplification in the labour response on impact. Unsurprisingly, when η
is small, a lower Φ/Yss is required for positive comovement to occur; since a smaller
η directly increases the volatility of the labour response. There exists trade-off
between these two parameters in the subset of the parameter space which enables
positive comovement (shown in figure 3.6 alongside the labour output elasticity).
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Figure 3.6: Inverse Frisch elasticity thresholds
Therefore, the inclusion of a time-varying labour wedge into a simple RBC frame-
work is capable of generating an empirically recognisable business cycles where con-
sumption, hours, investment and output all rise on impact of an investment shock.
Therefore, this framework breaks the “Barro-King Curse”, in an extremely sim-
ple and tractable framework with analytical proofs; fewer frictions than the New
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